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The defenders of American liberal institutions would
deny that their philosophical system stands opposed to human values such as
"family." Rather, they would
say that liberalism simply seeks to prevent the dead weight of custom
and tradition from arbitrarily imposing old structures and assumptions on
contemporary ways of life. Liberalism
frees individuals to make choices; but such can surely include the choice of
adherence to traditional institutions and lifestyles. Liberalism, they would say, does not seek social dissolution or
revolution, but only freedom of choice for the individual, who is–after all–logically
the cell of the body politic.
To the modern ear, this all sounds good. But alas, this declaration of neutrality may
not be true relative to the family, nor perhaps to other natural associations
such as village, neighborhood, and religious community. Indeed, even a look at the key texts of
liberal thought suggests a decided and innate bias against family bonds.
Turn, for example, to De Cive, the foundational
liberal work by Thomas Hobbes from 1642.
Here, in a famous phrase, he declares as "certainly false" the
Aristotelian argument "that man is a creature born fit for
society." Rather, Hobbes says, it
is perfectly clear that "all society…is either for gain, or for glory; not
so much for love of our fellowes, as for love of our selves." This quest for individual advantage even
extends into the family, where the honor that children show parents is
"nothing else but the estimation of another's power," while women
"dispose of their children at their own will." Even at the launch of the liberal idea, then,
it seems that the freedom to choose abortion, and so deny life to
the very small, was a logical and even necessary part of the liberal scheme.
Writing a half-century later, John Locke sought to paint
a more human face on the emerging society of free, competitive men and women,
and he carved out "a sort of rule and jurisdiction" by parents over
children when the latter were young.
But Locke could find no real role in his system for the institution of
marriage, beyond the reproductive function.
Indeed, once children are able to care for themselves, he said, the
marital bond "dissolves itself" and the sexual partners are "at
liberty till Hymen…summons them again to choose new mates" (Of
Civil Government). It seems that
a regime of weak marriages, easy divorce, and cohabitation may also be a innate
part of liberal social theory.
This hostility toward the family institution can even
lead the liberal into an alliance with the centralizing state. It was Jean Jacques Rousseau who, worried
lest free individuals descend into anarchy, insisted that each autonomous actor
"put his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of
the general will." This meant "that
there should be no partial society [such as family] within the State" (The
Social Contract). Indeed,
"the newly born infant, upon first opening his eyes, must gaze upon the
fatherland, and until his dying day should behold nothing else" (The
Government of Poland).
Liberalism targets the family because this little
platoon with its parochial interests prevents the emergence of truly free and
autonomous individuals. This is true in
the field of economics, as well, where the liberal vision of free market
capitalism also collides with the claims of family.
Consider the abstract nature
of the modern capitalist economy. The
modern joint stock corporation has no fixed loyalties, to persons or to
places. Simply to survive the maneuvers
and schemes of its rivals, this "artificial person" must seek every
advantage, no matter how small. The
corporation cannot relax. Its quest for
"life" and power (or, in economists' language, for "market
share") requires a restless energy.
Threatened by rivals on all sides, it becomes imperialistic out of
necessity: competitors must be swallowed up or run into the ground; and rival
centers of loyalty must also be neutralized.
The family is such a rival center of loyalty. The good home makes its own claims on
individuals, seeking their first allegiance.
Consider this family home through the eyes of the nervous, apprehensive,
morally neutral, joint-stock corporation:
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Family bonds interfere with
the efficient allocation of labor. The
economy wants each person to find his or her "one best use." The goals of maximum efficiency and economic
growth rest on this. It may mean that
the father/husband would provide the most gain working as an accountant in New
Jersey, while the mother/wife would be best used as a motel cleaner in
Wisconsin, while the children would ideally be employed as little coal miners
in West Virginia. Yet they remain in–say–their Maryland home,
all performing less efficient tasks, and so denying the economy their most
beneficial energies.
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Family bonds also suppress
capitalism's productive potential. Embodying the
alien principle of altruism, or love, family members share goods and services
outside the cash economy. Indeed, most
perversely, families actually operate under the old selfless mantra: from each
according to his or her ability, to each according to his or her need. Strong families commonly provide their own
child care, grow their own vegetables, cook their own food, teach their own
children, care for their own frail elderly: all tasks that could be organized
more efficiently on an industrial basis and paid for with cash. Economic growth actually depends on an ever
more refined specialization of labor and the transfer of uncounted
family functions into the cash economy.
The members of a strong family defy this need and behave as generalists,
doing many tasks in less efficient ways, which again spoils capitalism's prospects.
Indeed, both modern
corporation and modern state do suffer when families are strong, functional,
and self-reliant. Consider the intact
family of husband, wife, and six children on a twenty-acre homestead, with a
wood lot, pasture, and garden. The
family grows and preserves most of its vegetable needs and keeps chickens, a
few pigs, and a cow for home use. The
wife and older daughters sew most clothing for the family; the husband and
older boys make their own furniture in the woodshop and provide maintenance of
their old car and pickup. The children
weed the garden, feed the fowl, and clean the house and barn. Grandma sits by the fireplace, and helps as
she can. Meals are always home cooked
and the children study at home, with their parents as teachers.
Alas, the official Economy
and the State gain almost nothing from this family. The family buys relatively few factory-made goods, reducing corporate
earnings and state sales tax revenue.
Indeed, none of the family's home production activities add even a
dime to the Gross National Product or to government's coffers: they are
uncounted and untaxed. If the children
are kept out of the government schools, they also fail to learn about the goals
and beauty of "the General Will."
This family provides so little to either the official economy or the
state, that it might as well not exist.
But now consider the same
family torn apart by a divorce.
Two separate households are now needed, where before one sufficed,
meaning that another house, refrigerator, stove, and whole array of household
goods must be built or purchased. This
stimulates the GNP. The mother no
longer has time to tend a garden and chickens, cook meals, or sew clothing: she
needs to find a paying job. All these things
will now be purchased in the marketplace, as well. The father, meanwhile, has child support and alimony to pay, and
little incentive toward home carpentry.
He, too, turns to the marketplace to sell his labor, gain needed cash,
and buy the things he needs to survive.
The older children, for their part, now go to public school and learn to
appreciate the state's vision of the "General Will." The younger children are in day care, with
still more money passing hands. Instead
of family dinners, everyone eats on the run in the fast-food restaurants. And Grandma is now a Medicaid recipient in a
for-profit nursing home, doing her part as well to boost the GNP. In short, both the official economy and the state
claim vast positive gains from the act of divorce: and the
greater the family's disarray, the more they gain.
The defenders of democratic
capitalism would now change the subject.
Capitalism is about giving, they would say; capitalists actually want
strong families because it is in such homes that good "human capital"
is shaped: children of intelligence, character, and solid work habits.
Now, I grant that this is
sometimes true. By only–only–among
corporate entities strongly committed by circumstance or choice to a special
geographic location. Notably, such
firms are usually family-held.
Where the hired corporate manager at the joint stock corporation rarely
worries beyond three or four years into the future, family-held firms think a
generation or two ahead. For reasons of
birth, kinship, and friendships, these firms also commonly have special
loyalties to their home communities.
They will invest in the families and the well-being of the next generation,
because they see their children as part of that future community. In addition, they will work tirelessly to
keep their workforce intact, even during times of recession, because it is good
for the town.
Unfortunately, in our day, there
are not many of these firms left. And the
globalized market of the early 21st Century makes their
survival increasingly unlikely, as tariffs have shrunk, transportation costs
have dwindled, and the financial system has come to favor "going
public" as soon as possible. "Human
capital" can now be mined. Use it
up in one country; and then move the factory to another. Multi-generational family-held firms were
a way of reconciling capitalism's "creative destruction" with decency
and social order. But like the
Himalayan Snow Leopard, these large family-held businesses are today an
attractive but highly-endangered species threatened by the 21st Century
globalist order.
The Democratic Capitalist
responds again: Look at contemporary American politics, where corporate interests
and pro-family politics are in political alliance! Just read the editorials in The Wall Street Journal!
Understanding the place of
equity feminism in modern American life helps to clarify this situation. A casual look at America today does show
pro-life and pro-family voters largely attached to the Republican Party and so
in political alliance with Big Business.
Feminism, meanwhile, dominates the Democratic Party, in alliance with
the labor unions and the pro-abortion cause.
These are, however, unusual and unstable coalitions and ones not likely
to last.
Indeed, from the 1920's
until the early 1960's, the Republican Party was the party of equity feminism,
a movement which had a natural bond with the interests of big business: both
were products of the liberal vision. When the National Woman's Party crafted the proposed "Equal
Rights Amendment" to the U.S. Constitution back in 1923, it was
Republicans who first introduced the measure in the U.S. House and Senate. The National Association of Manufacturers,
ever hungry for cheap female labor, was the first big national organization to endorse
the ERA. Indeed, there is some evidence
that the Manufacturers Association covertly funded the radical National Woman's
Party during the 1920's and 1930's. The
Republican Party was the first major party to include the ERA in its national
platform. And, after the Birth Control
Federation of America cleverly changed its name to Planned Parenthood, this
organization became a favorite charity among Republican Women's Clubs.
The Democrats, meanwhile,
were the party more-or-less defending small property, Christian sexual
morality, and traditional family values.
So-called "maternalists" in the Party such as Frances Perkins
and Molly Dewson gave first priority to the protection of motherhood and traditional
homes. Central to Democratic economic
thinking was support for The Family Wage regime, a system of custom and law
that delivered to fathers and husbands a wage sufficient to support a mother
and children at home; and a system that celebrated and protected the roles of
homemaker and mother. Father John Ryan–of
this very University–justified the family wage through Catholic social
teaching; the labor movement justified it as economic fairness for union
families. The primary support for the
"family wage" came to be a system of "job segregation by
gender": the cultural assumption that there were "men's jobs"
and "women's jobs," and that men's jobs deserved higher compensation
because they commonly supported a wife and children, as well as the man. This method of taming capitalism's
anti-family tendencies actually proved to be highly effective, helping to produce
the Marriage Boom and the Baby Boom of the 1940's and 1950's.
Compared to today, though,
this world that I just described almost seems to be an alternate moral universe. How did we get from there to here?
Actually, we can trace the
change to a single day, February 8, 1964, when the American social-political order underwent a seismic
shift. But it is a change that you will
never read about in a civics textbook, because it is partly a tale of embarrassing
political farce. To close my remarks
this evening, I want to tell you something more about the extraordinary events
of that day, as a way of illustrating the peculiar spread of the liberal idea,
at the expense of the family.
The occasion was debate in
the U.S. House of Representatives over the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1964. The language of the bill on that Saturday
morning–as first drafted at the Lyndon Johnson White House–aimed at ending
discrimination "on the basis of race, color, religion,
or national origin" in the areas of voting, public accommodations
and education, federally assisted programs, and private employment. Reading between the lines, it was clear that
the latter provision on private employment–Title VII–would renew an old maternalist
goal from the interwar years: to remove those job barriers resting on race
prejudice that prevented African-American men from being good fathers,
husbands, and breadwinners.
Advocates used an argument that would surface again in the famed Moynihan
Report a year later: if the traditional family home was the basis of
American civilization, then full citizenship for black Americans required shoring
up the economic side of their faltering family system. Disproportionately characterized by
matriarchy, female-headed households, and illegitimacy, "the Negro-American
family"–as it was then called– needed to be reconfigured on the
prevailing breadwinner/homemaker model found among whites. If this could be done, racial equality would
result.
Yet the white segregationists in the House chamber,
their backs to the wall, had resolved on a desperate strategy. Seeking a "killer" amendment to
the Civil Rights Bill, these "Dixiecrats" proposed a change in the
language of Title VII that would–they thought–expose the danger of the
concept of "equality."Congressman Howard Smith of Virginia rose on
that February day and, with a broad smile, proposed that the word
"sex" be added to the list of prohibited discriminations in employment
under Title VII. To the laughter of his
colleagues, he reported on a letter he had received from a woman protesting the
excess number of American females, when compared to the count of American men,
revealed by the 1960 Census. Smith
read:
Just why the Creator would set up such an imbalance
of spinsters, shutting off the 'right' of every female to have a husband of her
own is, of course, known only to nature.
But I am sure you will agree that this is a grave injustice to womankind
and something the Congress and President Johnson should take immediate steps to
correct.
After making his little joke, though, Smith moved to
other, real issues: "Now, I am very serious about this amendment," he
told his colleagues. "I think we
all recognize…that all throughout industry women are discriminated against in
that…they do not get as high compensation for their work as do the majority
[sic] sex." To bring the matter
closer to his fellow politicians' hearts, he added: "I just want to remind
you here that in this election year it is pretty near half of the voters in
this country that are affected, so you had better sit up and take notice."
As the debate continued, his Dixiecrat colleagues
added their sometimes whimsical support.
J. Russell Tuten of Georgia said that as "a man, which places me in
the minority and makes me a second class citizen–and the fact that I am white
and from the South–I look forward to claiming my rights under this
legislation." Joe Pool of Texas
argued that the amendment would "safeguard American women from such
inequities with regard to their civil rights as are now threatened in the
pending civil rights bill." And L.
Mendel Rivers of South Carolina praised the proposed change for "making it
possible for the white Christian woman to receive the same consideration for
employment as the colored woman."
In retrospect, it is clear that a half century of
political reforms aimed at restoring "the traditional family" and
built on the family-wage ideal hung in the balance. And it appears that the heirs of this maternalist vision, and of
the New Deal policies that solidly embedded it into the law, understood that
their legacy was threatened. Pro-family
Democrats mounted their last stand.
Emanuel Cellar, Democrat
from New York, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, floor leader for the
Civil Rights bill, and a Jew, rose to challenge Mr. Smith. Notably, he argued for the natural inequality
of woman and man:
You know, the French have a phrase for it when they
speak of women and men…"vive la difference." I think the French are right.
Imagine the upheaval that
would result from the adoption of blanket language requiring total [sexual]
equality. Would male citizens be
justified in insisting that women share with them the burdens of compulsory
military service? What would become of
traditional family relationships? What
about alimony?…Would fathers rank equally with mothers in the right of custody
to children?…This is the entering wedge, an amendment of this sort.
Representative Cellar also noted
that the Women's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Labor (long a maternalist
stronghold) opposed this amendment, because sex discrimination involved
"problems significantly different" from race and other factors covered
by the bill's language.
Edith Green, a Democratic
Congress woman from Oregon, attacked Mr. Smith's amendment as an attempt to
"jeopardize" the primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act: "For every discrimination that has been
made against a woman in this country there has been 10 times as much
discrimination against the Negro….Whether we want to admit it or not, the main
purpose of this legislation today is to try to end the discrimination…against
Negroes." Moreover, she insisted
that there were real "biological differences" between men and women
that must be taken into account "in regard to employment."
But the equity feminists
hibernating on the Republican side of Congress, having spent forty years in the
political wilderness, sensed on that day their extraordinary, if peculiar,
opportunity. Congresswoman Katharine
St. George, a Republican from New York, took the podium and suggested that foes of the "sex" amendment still
saw women as "chattels." She
added: "Why should women be denied equality of opportunity? Why should women be denied equal pay for
equal work?" Congresswoman
Catherine May, a Republican from Washington, cited the deep concerns of The National
Woman's Party over the effect of an unamended Title VII on "the white,
native-born American woman of Christian religion."
Much to Mr. Smith's surprise, this unexpected
coalition of Republican equity feminists and Dixiecrat segregationists carried
the day, on a vote of 168 to 133: discrimination in employment on the basis of
"sex" would henceforth be a Federal crime. Two days later, the House approved the Civil Rights Act, as
amended. The measure went on to the
Senate, where Hubert Humphrey pushed the measure through, unchanged, throttling
a Southern filibuster.
So, in July, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, became law. The new Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC),
according to one friendly analyst, soon "converted Title VII into a magna
carta for female workers, grafting to it a set of rules and regulations that
certainly could not have passed Congress in 1964, and perhaps not a decade
later, either."
Most significantly, the EEOC
eliminated sex-specific hiring, seniority, and promotion practices. It was these forms of job segregation by
gender that had long served as the buttresses to America's family wage system,
guiding men toward the higher-paid positions and women toward the lower ones or
toward home. But now the economic
foundation of households would shift. The
flow of married women into the labor force accelerated. In consequence, it became more difficult to
sustain the "traditional American family" on one income. As female wages rose, male breadwinners
working full-time experienced a 28 percent decline in real wages between 1970
and 1990.
In the early 1970's, women
such as Phyllis Schlafly would battle Republican hierarchies to end that
party's support for the ERA and liberalized abortion: by 1980 so-called 'Reagan
Democrats'–commonly working class Catholics–moved into the Republican camp. Equity feminists migrated the other way,
producing the anomalous political situation in which we live today. My prediction, though, is that these
alliances will not last, but that is another story.
We can see here how the
liberal values of individualism and equality once again undermined arrangements
that sustained families within the turbulence of the modern market economy. Of course, the real victor here was not
"women," but market capitalism.
Business leaders had always deplored the idea of the "family
wage," for it drove up labor costs and restricted labor supply. They were delighted to see it go. Household members would all work harder now,
just to hold their own. Liberalism had
done its work again. The Gross National
Product grew, and family life shriveled.
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