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Rob [Schwarzwalder], thank you for that kind
introduction, for hosting this forum to call attention to the role of social
issues in the body politic, and for inviting this proud FRC alumnus to offer a
few words.
Any assessment of the
relationship between economic and social conservatism would not be complete
without a reference to Ronald Reagan. In 1977, less than three weeks after Jimmy
Carter was inaugurated as our 39th president, the former governor of
California laid out his vision of a renewed GOP that would advance “a program
of action based on political principle that can attract those interested in the
so-called ‘social’ issues and those interested in ‘economic’ issues.”
Speaking at the Conservative Political Action Conference, Reagan made it clear
that he was not interested in “a temporary uneasy alliance” between two
factions of conservatives, but in “the creation of a new, lasting majority,”
and one that is “committed to working always in the interest of the
American family.”
Reagan’s willingness to
welcome social conservatives into a party of primarily business and financial
interests had a lot to do his political success. But a generation later, his
vision of a lasting political coalition has yet to materialize. The GOP
dominance coveted by Lee Atwater, Newt Gingrich, and Karl Rove remains only a dream because the
alliance between economic and social conservatives has never been a full
partnership, and remains far more “uneasy” than most activists and observers are
willing to acknowledge.
The two factions give
appearances, especially every four years at convention time, of working together
for the good of the party. But the dirty little secret is that the conservative
movement and the Republican party remain far more conflicted over “social
issues” than “economic issues.” With few exceptions, the political consultants,
the think tanks and activist organizations, Fox News, and the editorial page of
the Wall Street Journal are far more devoted to promoting economic
conservatism than social conservatism.
Even the tea party movement,
which claims to be an indigenous force within the GOP, won’t touch the social
issues. Our issues are also off the table in Paul Ryan’s Road Map as well as the
new Top Guns book written by Representatives Ryan, McCarthy, and Cantor.
Now, “values issues” are not
entirely absent from the “Pledge to America” that the GOP House leadership
unveiled yesterday. Still, none of the five policy themes addresses the elephant
in the room, that is, the social crisis that predates both the Great
Recession and the presidency of Barack Obama. The document acknowledges the
“unraveling” of the “social fabric” and offers a token nod to “traditional
marriage” and a promise to stop federal funding of abortion. Yet the overriding
focus of the Pledge is on economic concerns, national security, and government
reform.
Nothing in the Pledge calls
for the reversal of a generation of bad court decisions and misguided public
policies that have devastated the American family and our social sector to a far
greater degree than any of the policies of Barack Obama have devastated our
economy. Now, could you imagine what would have happened, had the tables been
reversed, and none of the “five points” of the Pledge had specifically addressed
economic issues and Americans for Tax Reform had to plead with House leaders at
the eleventh hour to include a section on extending the Bush tax cuts?
I raise the question only to
demonstrate how far we have come from Reagan’s vision of a genuine working
partnership between economic and social conservatives. It is not a mutual
relationship by any stretch of the imagination. The economic conservatives run
the show, many of whom do not share Reagan’s commitment to the American family.
What Economic Conservatives
Get Wrong
This is why everything that
Ross [Douthart] has said today should resonate with those of us who call ourselves social
conservatives. We cannot simply defer to the Club for Growth, the Chamber of
Commerce, or AEI to dictate the GOP policy agenda, including economic and tax
initiatives. For starters, the economic conservatives have misdiagnosed the
nature of the current crisis. And we need to call them on that. In their static
analysis, the root problems facing America are economic and fiscal, not social
or moral.
I have great respect for
Arthur Brooks of AEI. But his analysis in his latest book, The Battle: How
the Fight between Free Enterprise and Big Government Will Shape America’s Future,
misses the mark. The decisive issue of our time is not so much the conflict
between the public and private sectors. Rather, it’s the deterioration of the
social sector, rooted in the marriage-based family, without which democratic
capitalism and constitutional government would not be possible. It is the social
sector that stands at most risk today.
Let me explain. My first
Power Point chart [see below] reveals the changes in the composition of U.S. households
since 1970. You will not find this in Top Guns or the Pledge. But if you
want to know what drives our national angst today--this chart is worth a 1,000
words. As the chart displays the data, we have not--since Richard Nixon was
president--experienced any growth in the one variable that offers the most
promise of sustained prosperity: the number of households composed of married
parents with children less than 18 years of age. But we have seen more than a
tripling of households with neither marriage nor children. Keep in mind that
this chart does not include single-parent households, which have also more than
tripled since 1970, another negative economic indicator.
I could go into a lot more
detail here, but our party fails to understand the reality that America does not
suffer so much of a fiscal deficit than a demographic deficit. The reason
why we face huge liabilities with Social Security and Medicare is because my
generation, the Boomers, did not follow in the footsteps of our parents and
produce a sufficient number of descendents to, as Theodore Roosevelt would said,
to “keep the nation moving forward.” A lot of this has to do, by the way,
with the legalization of abortion.
Many economists, including
Robert Samuelson and David P. Goldman, agree that these patterns, particularly
the growth of single-parent households, do not bode well for the future of the
housing industry, the future of the economy, or the future of America. TR, one
of our nation’s greatest presidents and in many ways the father of modern social
conservatism, would call this national suicide.
Nor do these social patterns
bode well for the development of “individual character” that, as Lawrence [Reed] has
nicely explained, undergirds liberty and prosperity, nor for the “common set of
civic virtues” identified by Steven Malanga of the Manhattan Institute—virtues
that are learned primarily in the family and that undergird both market and
state. From Adam Smith to Alexis de Tocqueville to Max Weber, astute observers
have long recognized that American exceptionalism rests on a certain cultural,
ethical, and even religious foundation. Yet, as Lawrence [Reed] noted, this rich
foundation has been deteriorating since the 1970s, in lock step with our retreat
from marriage and family formation. Consequently, our economic system operates
today in a near ethical vacuum that would cause Adam Smith, who was a moral
philosopher, to turn over in his grave.
Second, because the economic
conservatives have misdiagnosed the crisis of our time, their prescriptions will
not deliver what they promise. For years, conservatives have oversold the
ability of free enterprise to deliver the goods in a cultural context that is
disengaged from that “common set of civic virtues.” Here I want to draw
attention to my second Power Point slide [see below] that suggests that the Reagan boom, the
model that Republicans consider ideal, was not everything that they claim,
especially when compared to the post World War Two boom. In the immediate
postwar era, household income largely kept pace with GDP, and did so with only
one wage earner in the vast majority of households. But in the Reagan era, when
the GDP increased at the same pace as it did in the earlier era, the median
income of married-couple families chugged along a much slower pace; the income
of the one-earner family increased only 4 percent. If we extend the time line
beyond 2005, family-income growth would turn negative. Ironically, this
“achievement” occurred as a greater proportion of the workforce earned college
degrees, more married mothers joined the labor force, and average family size
dropped from four to two children. The data debunk the claim made by many
economic conservatives that the American family will recover once we get the
economy moving again. If the family struggled under the Reagan boom, why would
it recover now?
What Social Conservatives Get
Wrong
Now, I have heaped a lot of
blame on economic conservatives. But I have to give them credit: they know how
to advance their vision and they have been more far more strategic than social
conservatives in driving the policy agenda. After thirty years of pushing our
issues, social conservatives have little to show for that effort. “If we were
a business, we would be bankrupt,” laments my colleague Allan Carlson.
“If we were a sports team, we would be in last place.”
Carlson believes that social
conservatives have invested too much stock in electoral politics—thinking that
winning elections, and fighting for issues no matter what the outcome, will
yield results. That defensive strategy, he claims, has contributed to social
conservatives being known more by what we’re against—abortion, euthanasia, and
homosexuality—than what we stand for: life-long marriage, the natural family, a
flourishing social sector, and the elevation of the needs of children above the
desires of adults. We have failed to play offense by putting these civic and
social virtues front and center. As a result, we have not been able to
collaborate all that well with either party on behalf of a wide range of
initiatives, including economic and tax policies, that would make marriage and
family formation more affordable and foster the return of the child-rich family to
the centerpiece of American life. As Ross [Douthat] suggests, our agenda must be more
comprehensive than simply blocking the legal redefinition of marriage, as
important as that is.
We also need to formulate
more winsome and persuasive arguments. At times we frame our rhetoric in
religious terminology that makes it sound like we are preaching or that we are
telling people how they should live. At the core of these shortcomings is that
we often fail to separate our private lives from public policy, a
problem of liberals as well. Consequently, we come across as if we are promoting
a personal agenda, not the “general welfare” of the Constitution. Rather than
framing critical realities like marriage and the family as enduring ideals that
cut to the very heart of American identity and exceptionalism, we frame social
norms as “our values,” as if they belong to one party or one faction in the
party.
So if social conservatives
want to get out of the basement, we need to find better ways to advance these
issues. We need to clarify that we are attempting to shape law and public policy
around normative arrangements that are justified by time, reinforced by the
social and biological sciences, and foster happiness, social peace, and
prosperity. We need to find a way to help our fellow Americans understand the
DNA of the social and economic order in ways that do not threaten them but
inspire them.
Perhaps we should follow the
pattern of the Tea Party and declare our independence from both political
parties, but also distance ourselves from the purely economic conservatives who
do not understand the importance of the social sector. We should want the
parties--and even economic conservatives--to seek us and our policy ideas, not
vice versa. By operating independently . . . by playing offense and making our
case winsomely . . . we might just be able to achieve the full partnership that
Reagan envisioned but more important, his “new, lasting majority” that
has dogged the GOP for a generation. Thank you.

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