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The Real Danger of
Same-Sex Marriage
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By Stephen
Baskerville*
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* Stephen Baskerville is an Earhart Fellow at The Howard Center for
Family, Religion & Society. He is grateful to Allan Carlson and Bryce
Christensen for critical comments of earlier drafts. Responsibility for
the contents is his alone. |
Undermining
traditional marriage threatens not only the family and social stability, but
civil freedom.
The American Political Science Association recently
began promoting same-sex marriage in a series of articles that read more like
polemic on behalf of the gay and women’s rights movements than dispassionate
scholarly appraisals of a political phenomenon.[1] With the academic world increasingly
accused of losing touch with the concerns of ordinary citizens, it is ironic
that political scientists should depart from the norms of disinterested
scholarship in such a way as to further marginalize the academy rather than
explore issues that will bring it closer to public concerns. The trend reaches its reductio ad
absurdum in Jyl Josephson’s complaint that same-sex marriage will not likely
do enough to erode heterosexual marriage.[2]
This is doubly unfortunate, because
political scientists have a unique perspective to offer on social issues, which
are often debated without full understanding of the operations of government
institutions. Social reforms often
carry unintended consequences, nowhere more so than in family policy. A full appreciation for the implications
of same-sex marriage is more likely if we examine it in the larger political
context of marriage and the family.
When we do, we may discover why the
polarization of American society represented in the 2004 election has centered
around precisely these questions of marriage and family and that same-sex
marriage may prove only a preliminary skirmish. While both sides focus on homosexuality,
larger questions lurk behind this controversy.
Aside from feminist treatments that are largely
theoretical and almost uniformly hostile, the larger politics of marriage has
received little practical attention from scholars concerned with the role and
boundaries of the state. Family and
marriage are generally debated as economic or cultural questions that remain
largely the province of psychology, sociology, social work, and law. One exception proves the rule. When James Q. Wilson, weighed in
recently on family non-formation in low-income communities, it was only to throw
up his hands in despair: “If you
believe, as I do, in the power of culture, you will realize that there is very
little one can do.”[3] Like many
others (including the Clinton and Bush administrations), Wilson is reduced to
advocating marriage “education.”
Basic political questions are
conspicuously missing from current debates: What precisely is the legal status of
marriage, and what is the appropriate role of the state in private families and
households? How does
government-recognized marriage affect the boundary between public and
private? What legitimate role does
the church play, and what are the relations of church and state insofar as each
claims a role in marriage?
Josephson argues for a “connection
between access to the institution of marriage and full citizenship,” insisting
that “marriage is central to ideas of citizenship.” She also notes that this “monumental
public character” carries a paradoxical corollary: that “marriage establishes
the right to a realm of privacy.”[4]
But there are dimensions to these principles she does not explore, and
they are precisely the ones that are now transforming public policy. One scholar likens the family crisis to
the Civil War, with constitutional implications that could prove equally
profound.[5] G.K. Chesterton once
suggested that the family serves as the principal check on state power and
predicted that someday the state and family would directly confront one
another.[6] Same-sex marriage is just
one indication that that day has arrived.
Another is the Bush
administration’s proposal for marriage education programs. These
essentially continue the fatherhood programs promoted by the Clinton
administration and other governments during the 1990s. They too are
justified on the principle that marriage is a “public” institution, with
public benefits extending beyond private individuals. “Marriage is a
public social good,” writes Matt Daniels of the Alliance for Marriage.
“The health of American families — built upon marriage — affects us all.”[7]
Conservatives insist that the family
is the building block of civil society and that undermining marriage could
therefore threaten the social basis of civilization itself. Though plausible, explaining precisely
how this scenario will play out, both concerning the family generally and
same-sex marriage in particular, has proved more elusive. While most Americans are instinctively
uneasy about gay marriage, it is not obvious precisely how it will weaken
conventional marriage. Even some
traditionalists doubt the likely effectiveness of a constitutional
amendment. Some oppose gay marriage
as the “last straw” in a series of threats to the family. But simply preventing the last straw is
not addressing the larger problem.
Likewise, some conservatives
question the administration’s plans to promote marriage education and ask how
government officials can enhance anyone’s marriage.[8] But liberal opposition has
been more vocal. The American
Prospect argues that government
should not be meddling in private households. The Economist has
called the initiative “Orwellian.”[9]
Administration officials reply that
marriage promotion will in fact reduce government intrusiveness. Assistant Secretary of Health and Human
Services (HHS) Wade Horn argues that “rather than an expansion of government,
the President’s Healthy Marriage Initiative is an exercise in limited
government.” Horn points out that a huge volume of
domestic spending is directly connected to family
dissolution:
My agency
spends $46 billion per year operating 65 different social programs. If one
goes down the list of these programs — from child welfare, to child-support
enforcement, to anti-poverty assistance to runaway-youth initiatives — the need
for each is either created or exacerbated by the breakup of families and
marriages.... Controlling the growth of these programs depends on
preventing problems from happening in the first place. One way...is to
help couples form and sustain healthy marriages.[10]
Significantly, Horn illustrates with
Orwellian scenarios of his own: “Government is most intrusive into family life
when marriages fail,” he adds. “Try
getting married, having kids, and then getting a divorce.... Government will
tell you when you can see your children, whether you can pick them up after
school or not, and if so, on what days, whether you can authorize medical care
for your children, and how much money you must spend on your kids. By preventing marital breakup in the
first place...one obviates the need for such intrusive
government.”
Yet Horn does not distinguish the
public’s interest from the state’s.
Government is not necessarily a neutral player, and invoking the “public”
nature of marriage to justify marshalling the state machinery to enhance
citizens’ private lives and even to define (and potentially redefine) marriage
is, at the least, a complex and somewhat ironic maneuver. Whether his plan can succeed — and the
likely consequences of same-sex marriage too — depends upon the larger political
context of state structures that are already transforming marriage and family
life.
A Public
Institution 
In
different ways then, both sides are arguing for marriage as a “public”
institution.[11]
But this truism requires some qualification. The legal systems of the
Common Law countries have long recognized the family as a private zone that is
off-limits to government — what Supreme Court Justice Byron White called a
“realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”[12]
Family inviolability
was never absolute, but the basic principle has been established for centuries
and most emphatically in connection with what traditionalists themselves point
out is the unique and foremost purpose of marriage and family: raising children.
The private family creates a legal bond between parent and child that allows
parents, within reasonable limits, to raise their children according to their
own principles, free from government interference. “Whatever else it may
accomplish, marriage acknowledges and secures the relation between a child and a
particular set of parents,” writes Susan Shell. “The right to one’s own
children...is perhaps the most basic individual right — so basic we hardly think
of it.”[13]
This right has long been recognized
by the Supreme Court and the Common Law.
Numerous decisions have held that parenthood is an “essential” right,
“far more precious than property rights,” that “undeniably warrants deference,
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.”[14] “The liberty interest and the integrity
of the family encompass an interest in retaining custody of one’s children,”
according to one decision.[15]
Parental rights have been characterized by the courts as “sacred” and
“inherent, natural right[s], for the protection of which, just as much as for
the protection of the rights of the individual to life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness, our government is formed.”[16]
Today this principle has become
largely a fiction, and not a fiction because of same-sex marriage. Shell summarizes commonplace notions
that, until recently, have been virtually universal among free societies: “No known society treats the question of
who may properly call a child his or her own as simply...a matter to be decided
entirely politically as one might distribute land or wealth,” she
writes.
No known
government, however brutal or tyrannical, has ever denied, in fact or principle,
the fundamental claim of parents to their children.... A government that
distributed children randomly... could not be other than tyrannical. ... A
government that paid no regard to the claims of biological parenthood would be
unacceptable to all but he most fanatical of egalitarian or communitarian
zealots.[17]
Though unexceptionable as society’s
moral consensus, Shell’s points also provide an unintended commentary on the
ignorance that pervades today’s debates.
For current marriage law in the Western democracies has rendered these
statements both prescient and factually false. “No known government” ever crossed this
line until about thirty years ago — well before same-sex marriage — when most of
the Western democracies did so. It
is having precisely the consequences she postulates.
While Shell uses the gender-neutral
“parents,” this function of marriage to protect the parent-child bond is far
more important for fathers than for mothers. Margaret Mead once pointed out that the
weakest link in the family chain is always the father; motherhood is an
indisputable biological fact, whereas fatherhood is a social construct.[18] The social institution that creates
fatherhood is marriage.
In fact, it is no exaggeration to
say that, politically speaking, the most important function of marriage is to
create paternity. Other benefits
are rightly claimed for marriage by its advocates. But in the end, the central one is this,
to establish fatherhood.[19] Once
this is understood, everything else about the current problems of marriage and
the family falls into place. And
once this is understood, the vitiating problem with same-sex marriage becomes
clear.
Marriage turns a man from a sperm
donor into a parent and thus creates paternal authority, allowing a man to
exercise the authority over children that otherwise would be exercised by the
mother alone. Feminists understand
this when they renounce marriage as an institution of “patriarchy.”[20] Among some conservatives, it has become
almost a cliché that marriage exists foremost to civilize men and control their
promiscuity.[21] If so, it performs
this role as part of a larger function: to protect the father-child bond and
with it the intact family. This
point, potentially the strongest in their case, is overlooked by some
traditionalists who argue that marriage undergirds civilization. For it is the presence of the father
that creates both the intact family and, by the same measure, the civil
institution itself. Thomas Hobbes
attributed to married fatherhood a central role in the process of moving from
the state of nature into civic life.
In nature, Hobbes argued, “the dominion is in the
mother”:
For in
the condition of mere nature, where there are no matrimonial
laws, it cannot be known who is the
father, unless it be declared by the mother. And therefore the right of dominion over
the child dependeth on her will and is consequently hers.[22]
Only in civil society, where
“matrimonial laws” do operate, is authority over children shared with the
father.
Our legal system has long insisted
that marriage, not sperm, determines the father. This is the purpose behind Lord
Mansfield’s Rule stipulating that a child born within marriage is presumed to be
that of the husband: It enabled a
marriage to survive the wife’s adultery.[23]
(Earlier ages had perhaps a more balanced assessment of the female and
male sex drives.)
The role of marriage in establishing
paternity is also seen in its absence.
Today, the weakening of marriage and the family produces fatherless, not
usually motherless, homes (at least not initially). As out-of-wedlock births have exploded,
governments have developed elaborate bureaucratic substitutes for marriage in
their efforts to “establish paternity” for purposes of collecting child support
and (it is claimed) connecting fathers with their children.[24]
The different but interchangeable labels used for similar family promotion
programs to address this problem by the last two administrations recognize that
fatherhood (Clinton) and marriage (Bush) are inseparable.[25]
Seen in this light, same-sex
marriage serves no useful social purpose; indeed, it is an absurdity. It attempts to apply gender
interchangeability at precisely the point where gender difference demands that
biological reality (motherhood) be reconciled to social necessity (fatherhood),
as the Goodridge decision
acknowledges by replacing the presumption of paternity with a presumption of
“parenthood.” But far from
establishing fatherhood, and therefore a settled and stable family situation,
this compounds the problem of who precisely are the parents of a given
child. A presumption of
“parenthood” confers parent status on any individual recognized as “married” to
another individual who acquires a child by whatever means. Gallagher calls this the problem of “too
many parents,”[26] and it is not the only complication.
Once marriage becomes detached from
procreation, therefore, the entire system of domestic and social stability that
marriage exists to foster unravels.[27]
Marriage then is no longer an autonomous and self-renewing institution,
mediating the generational interface between public and private, and therefore
limiting government power. Instead,
it becomes merely a prize in the competition for power and one to be passed out
by the very state it once served to control, a form of government patronage
handed out to favored groups based on their relative power, like jobs or
contracts. This is precisely what
has now happened. It is the meaning
of Josephson’s claim and that of gay groups that access to marriage constitutes
a badge of “citizenship” and mark of “equality.” (Ironically but tellingly, as Josephson
points out, “Feminist political and legal theorists have critiqued the
institution of heterosexual marriage,” with its inclusion of fatherhood, “as
harmful to women’s status as citizens.”)[28]
With this kind of marriage, the family no longer even renews itself
naturally — its unique advantage over the state, according to Chesterton — since
it cannot produce children of its own, but must take them from
others.
Indeed, what is true of marriage is
also true of those whom marriage exists to foster: children. As marriage has weakened, children have
become pawns and weapons in the competition for political power. This is true in several obvious policy
areas — divorce, child abuse and child protection, foster care, adoption,
domestic violence, schooling — though it is spreading beyond family policy to a
vast array of other policies and programs, from seat-belt laws to tobacco and
gun lawsuits to welfare and even international treaties, that are now justified
“for the children.” Decisions
previously left to parents are now taken by government officials, which not only
transfers control over children from parents to the state, but also rationalizes
policy innovations that limit adult freedom.
But while same-sex marriage may be
the most stark example of how redefining marriage undermines the social function
marriage serves, it is not the only one.
Redefining Marriage 
Governments have long claimed some control over marriage,
whether solemnized through a religious or a civil ceremony. Some object to practices like marriage
licenses, claiming the state has no business defining the terms of a private
agreement or of an institution that predates civil government. Libertarians propose “privatizing”
marriage as a purely civil contract, and some liberals have more provocatively
argued for “abolishing” marriage as a state-sanctioned act.[29] Traditionalists object, since this would
presumably permit forms of marriage other than a man and a woman. Yet so long as a private marriage
contract is enforceable in law, marriage would actually enjoy more legal
protection than it has today.
Whatever the state’s precise role in
marriage formation, politically it is far less important than another
question. The institutional
strength of marriage — and its connection with larger issues of public policy —
is determined not by the words through which a marriage is formed, but by the
deeds through which a marriage is dissolved.
Here the central players, as both
sides have acknowledged, are not homosexuals, but heterosexuals. “The weakening of marriage has been
heterosexuals’ doing, not gays’, for it is their infidelity, divorce rates, and
single-parent families that have wrought social damage,” observes the
Economist.[30] Marriage advocate Maggie Gallagher
dismisses this argument as a “lawyer’s trick,”[31]
but proponents of gay marriage have used it to great effect. “The problem
today is not gay couples wanting to get married,” writes Jonathan Rauch.
“The threat to marriage is straight couples not wanting to get married or straight couples not staying
married.”[32] Traditionalists’
attempts to take the moral high ground have clearly been undermined, even among
potential sympathizers, by their inability to answer this point effectively.
“People who won’t censure divorce
carry no special weight as defenders of marriage,” writes columnist Froma
Harrop. “Moral authority doesn’t
come cheap.”[33] Some marriage
advocates, like Michael McManus of Marriage Savers, themselves point out that
“divorce is a far more grievous blow to marriage than today’s challenge by
gays.”[34]
Though scholars defending gay
marriage have picked up on this paradox,[35] its implications cut both ways. For the corollary is that the push for
same-sex marriage is mostly a symptom of how altered marriage has already become
for other reasons. Gay marriage
would almost certainly not be an issue today if marriage had not already been
transformed by heterosexuals.
“Commentators miss the point when they oppose homosexual marriage on the
grounds that it would undermine traditional understandings of marriage,” writes
Bryce Christensen. “It is only
because traditional understandings of marriage have already been severely
undermined that homosexuals are now laying claim to it.”[36] Though gay activists cite their very
desire to marry as evidence that their lifestyle is not inherently promiscuous,
they also acknowledge that that desire arises only by the promiscuity permitted
in modern marriage. “The world of
no-strings heterosexual hookups and 50% divorce rates preceded gay marriage,”
Andrew Sullivan points out, unexceptionably. “All homosexuals are saying...is that,
under the current definition,
there’s no reason to exclude us. If
you want to return straight marriage to the 1950s, go ahead. But until you
do, the exclusion of gays is simply
an anomaly — and a denial of basic civil equality.” Historian Stephanie Coontz likewise
notes, “Gays and lesbians simply looked at the revolution heterosexuals had
wrought and noticed that, with its new norms, marriage could work for them, too.”[37]
Josephson pushes the polemical envelope. Having accurately blamed marriage
deterioration on heterosexual divorce, she uses that fact to rationalize
undermining it further through same-sex marriage. “The state-created
institution of marriage has historically been altered...to serve new or newly
recognized state interests,” she argues, invoking the same intrusive policy
innovations cited by Horn: “no-fault divorce” and “heightened enforcement of
child support.”[38]
These arguments from both ends of
the spectrum illustrate why it is futile to assess the strength of marriage as
an institution or understand its significance for civic life without confronting
its nemesis: divorce. Though
traditionalists decry efforts to “redefine” marriage, the more basic
redefinition of marriage has already been effected by the little-understood
system of unilateral or “no-fault” divorce.
The
Abolition of Marriage 
Some three decades ago, while few
were paying attention, the Western world embarked on what may turn out to be the
boldest social experiment in its history.
With no public discussion of the possible consequences, laws were enacted
in virtually every jurisdiction that effectively ended marriage as a legal
contract. Today it is not possible
to form a binding agreement to create a family.
The result was more than the removal of
government from enforcement of the contract; it allowed the government to
enforce the abrogation of the contract.
Regardless of the terms by which a marriage is entered, government
officials can, at the request of one spouse, simply dissolve it (and the
household created by it) over the objection of the other with no penalty to the
moving party. Gallagher aptly
titled her 1996 book, The Abolition of Marriage. It is
difficult to see how legalizing gay marriage can weaken an institution that has
already been legally “abolished,” nor how a constitutional amendment can protect
a contract that is now unenforceable in law.
In contrast to same-sex marriage,
no-fault divorce was never subject to a public debate. Gallagher once attributed this silence
to “political cowardice”: “Opposing
gay marriage or gays in the military is for Republicans an easy, juicy,
risk-free issue,” she complained.
“The message [is] that at all costs we should keep divorce off the
political agenda.” No American
politician of national stature has seriously challenged involuntary
divorce. “Democrats did not want to
anger their large constituency among women who saw easy divorce as a hard-won
freedom and prerogative,” writes Barbara Dafoe Whitehead. “Republicans did not want to alienate
their upscale constituents or their libertarian wing, both of whom tended to
favor easy divorce, nor did they want to call attention to the divorces among
their own leadership.”[39] In his
famous denunciation of single parenthood, Vice President Dan Quayle was careful
to make clear, “I am not talking about a situation where there is a
divorce.”[40]
The exception proves the rule. When the late Pope John Paul II spoke out
against divorce in January 2002, he was roundly criticized from both the right
and the left.[41]
Why this deafening silence, even
among political figures who now claim to be defending
marriage?
In the years since
it was enacted, no-fault divorce has grown into a huge state and private
machinery; in fact, few enterprises have forged so intimate and elaborate a
public-private symbiosis. Thirty years of unrestrained divorce has created
vast interests with a stake in encouraging it. David Schramm cautiously
estimates that divorce costs the public $33.3 billion annually.[42]
But divorce is more than a lucrative
industry; it is also a vast governmental regime. Divorce and custody are the cash cow of
the judiciary, constituting some 35-50% of civil litigation,[43] and also bring
employment and earnings to a host of executive and legislative officials, plus
private hangers-on: lawyers, psychotherapists, mediators, counselors, social
workers, child support agents, and more.
Divorce litigation fuels well-known lines of political and judicial
patronage.[44] “The judge occupies a
vital position...because of his control over lucrative patronage positions,”
according to Herbert Jacob, where appointments “are generally passed out to the
judge’s political cronies or to persons who can help his private
practice.”[45] Divorce also fills
state and local government coffers with federal money for a host of
divorce-related social problems. So
entrenched has divorce become within our political economy and political culture
that even its critics seem to have developed a stake in having something to
bemoan. Hardly anyone has an
incentive to bring it under control.
Indeed, divorce and unmarried
childbearing may have political implications we are only beginning to
understand, since they act as major engines for the overall expansion of
government power at all levels. As
Daniels and Horn point out, family dissolution breeds a host of societal ills
for government to solve. Virtually
every major social pathology, from violent crime to drug abuse to truancy, is
directly attributable to family breakdown and fatherless homes more than any
single factor, surpassing race and poverty.[46]
While this has long been recognized
within social policy, the political implications have never been thoroughly
pursued. “If we want less
government, we must have stronger families,” President Jimmy Carter once said,
“for government steps in by necessity when families have failed.”[47]
But Carter may have perceived the cause-and-effect backward, for it follows that
the state has a self-interest in failed families and a motive to step in and
declare failure when given the opportunity. This is precisely what divorce
courts do: “No-fault divorce gave judges, at the request of one-half of
the couple, the right to decide when a marriage had irretrievably broken down.”[48]
In ironic contrast to marriage,
divorce is often defended as a “private” matter and therefore immune from public
scrutiny; some even describe it as a “civil liberty.”[49] In practice, divorce raises fundamental
questions about the reach of the state into private life that have never been
confronted. Far more than marriage,
divorce by its nature requires active and almost incessant government
intervention. Marriage creates a
private household, which may or may not necessitate signing some legal
documents. Divorce dissolves not
only a marriage, but also the private household formed by it, usually against
the wishes of one spouse. It
inevitably involves state functionaries — including police and prisons — to
enforce the post-marriage order.
Otherwise, one spouse might continue to claim the protections and
prerogatives of private life: the right to live in the common home, to possess
the common property, or — most vexing of all — to parent the common children.
Few stopped to consider the
implications of laws that shifted the breakup of private households from a
voluntary to an involuntary process.
If marriage is not a wholly private affair, involuntary divorce by its
nature requires constant supervision over private life by state officials. Divorce by mutual agreement carries few
consequences. But mutual agreement
governs only about 20% of divorces; in the remaining 80% the government assumes
control over the private life of at least one individual without that
individual’s consent — and when he or she may be unimpeachable before the
law.[50] In these circumstances,
unilateral divorce involves state agents forcibly removing people from their
homes, confiscating their property, and separating them from their
children. It poses an inherent
threat to the inviolability of not only marriage, but the very concept of
private life.
The involvement of the judiciary,
with its handmaid, the penal apparatus, indicates how marriage dissolution blurs
distinctions the justice system once delineated carefully: private versus
public, civil versus criminal, therapy versus justice, sin versus crime. No-fault divorce introduced novel legal
concepts, such as the principle that one could be decreed guilty of violating an
agreement that one had, in fact, not violated. “According to therapeutic precepts, the
fault for marital breakup must be shared, even when one spouse unilaterally
seeks a divorce,” observes Whitehead.
“Many husbands and wives who did not seek or want divorce were stunned to
learn...that they were equally ‘at fault’ in the dissolution of their
marriages.”[51]
The “fault” that was ostensibly thrown out the front door of divorce proceedings
re-entered through the back, but now without precise definition. The
judiciary was expanded from its traditional role of punishing crime or tort to
punishing personal imperfections and private differences: suddenly, one could be
summoned to court without having committed any legal infraction; the verdict was
pre-determined before any evidence was examined; and one could be found “guilty”
of things that were not illegal. “Lawmakers eliminated a useful inquiry
process and replaced it with an automatic outcome,” writes Judy Parejko.
“No other court process is so devoid of recourse for a defendant. When one
spouse files for divorce, his/her spouse is automatically found ‘guilty’ of
irreconcilable differences and is not allowed a defense.”[52]
Though marriage
ostensibly falls under civil law, the logic quickly extended into the criminal
realm. The “automatic outcome” expanded into what effectively became a
presumption of guilt against the involuntarily divorced spouse (“defendant”).
Yet the due process protections of formal criminal proceedings did not apply, so
involuntary litigants could be criminalized without any action on their part and
in ways they were powerless to avoid. In some jurisdictions, the defendant
in a divorce case is the only party in the courtroom without legal immunity.[53]
Politically, no-fault divorce did
much more than allow families to self-destruct. It permitted the state in the person of
a single judge to assume jurisdiction over the private lives of citizens who
were minding their own business and turn otherwise lawful private behavior into
crimes. Previously, a citizen could
be incarcerated only following conviction by a jury for willfully violating a
specific statute, passed with citizen input and after deliberation by elected
legislators, that applied equally to all.
Suddenly, a citizen could be arrested and jailed without trial for
failing to live in conformity with an order, formulated in a matter of minutes
from limited information by an unelected judge, that applied to no one but
himself (it is usually, for reasons we will see, the man) and whose provisions
might well be beyond his ability to obey.[54] In effect, a personalized criminal code
is legislated ad hoc around each
divorced spouse, subjecting him or her to arrest for doing what anyone else may
lawfully do.
Unilateral divorce thus placed the
family in a legal-political status precisely the opposite of the original
purpose of marriage. Far from
preserving a private sphere of life immune from state intervention, involuntary
divorce opened private lives to unprecedented state control. Thus the irony of those who question why
gay partners should wish to have the “benefits” of marriage and thus open their
private lives to the increasingly conspicuous horrors of family law
proceedings.[55] Indeed, a California
bill legalizing same-sex marriage was nicknamed the “gay divorce law,” because
it would force individuals wishing to part company into court proceedings and to
spend money on lawyers.[56]
Previously, in the eyes of the law, such a couple was simply two
individuals in a household, whose sexual “intimacy” was a matter of official
indifference. With marriage or
civil unions, they become spouses or “intimate partners” into whose private
lives the state may insert its coercive authority at the mere invitation of
either, with any grievance or none.
The logic reached its conclusion in
proposals recently published by the American Law Institute (ALI).[57] This influential practitioners’ group
announced that the scope of family law would be extended to encompass
jurisdiction over non-marital private arrangements such as cohabiting couples,
both heterosexual and homosexual, and indeed all private homes.
Marriage defenders
protested, but they seem to have misunderstood the implications. As they
now argue with respect to same-sex marriage, traditionalists charged that ALI
was undermining marriage by blurring the distinction between traditional
marriage and cohabitation.[58]
But ALI was doing much more than
this. Family law practitioners were
using the toehold they had established in married households through divorce law
to extend state jurisdiction into every household entailing an “intimate
relationship,” regardless of whether that household was created through
marriage. Divorce operatives were
declaring that no home was too private to be beyond the reach of official
scrutiny. With breathtaking irony,
an “intimate relationship” (which officials reserved for themselves to define)
became not a status which is off-limits to government supervision, but precisely
the opposite, one that gives government an entrée to exert virtually unlimited power over personal
life. The “abolition of marriage”
brought in its wake the abolition of private life.
Parens Patriae, or the State as Parent

To compound the irony, the factor
that now overwhelmingly justifies state intervention into private life is the
very one that had previously necessitated keeping the state out: children. As with same-sex marriage, by ignoring
children, a case can be made that divorce affects no one beyond the couple. Once children are introduced, the
dynamic changes fundamentally. Here
too the politics of same-sex marriage and divorce become further intertwined in
ways not addressed in the current debates.
Before the divorce revolution, legal
authority over children had long been recognized to reside with their parents,
absent some transgression. “For
centuries it has been a canon of law that parents speak for their minor
children,” wrote Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart. “So deeply embedded in our traditions is
this principle of the law that the Constitution itself may compel a state to
respect it.”[59] This too has been
not only abrogated, but directly inverted by divorce law, which proceeds from
precisely the opposite principle: that “the child’s best interest is perceived
as being independent of the parents, and a court review is held to be necessary
to protect the child’s interests.”[60]
As many have observed of marriage
itself,[61] introducing children into marriage politics brings pressures for
gender differentiation. While
differences in the treatment of men and women have theoretically been
eliminated, those governing the allocation of children remain stubbornly
resistant. They are now, however,
subject to some ironic distortions.
Traditionally, as Allan Carlson
points out, governments set the terms of marriage less to provide rights than to
impose obligations. Even the
protections of marriage were originally “burdens,” and (consistent with the
state’s interest in supervising marital dissolution) the ones Carlson enumerates
all pertain to divorce: “alimony, child custody, and the division of
property.”[62] Not only do these
obligations only come into play with divorce; they originally served as
disincentives to it. Significantly,
these burdens were not symmetrical; they all involved removing something from
the man. But they were accepted,
because as long as he remained faithful, the man in return derived from marriage
that vital protection we examined at the beginning: the right to have children
recognized as his. This too has
become a fiction.
Because it demonstrates irrefutable
limits to gender interchangeability, the role of marriage in establishing
paternity is a central feminist grievance and marriage itself a feminist
target. “Kinship laws still
establish married men’s paternity through marriage, not through their biological
relationship with children,” observes Josephson, echoing Hobbes. “By this means, women are equated with
nature and their relationship to children is biological, whereas men’s
relationship to children is established politically through the law of
marriage.” Josephson emphasizes
that the “political” nature of paternity constitutes the central feminist
objection to marriage: “While it is
true that men who are not married are declared fathers through paternity
procedures in child support laws, which may entail paternity tests, the marital
relation is still retained in paternity law: the existence of a legal marriage
contract trumps biological paternity.
The marriage contract creates fathers as political beings; moreover,
marriage still functions to control women’s sexuality for the purposes of
ensuring a politically controlled genealogy.”[63]
Josephson’s
exception is significant. Whatever objections proceed from their
theoretical purity, feminists have also been very skillful at maneuvering these
paternity rules to their own political purposes. Using the new divorce
laws, they have diametrically inverted the effect of marriage and turned
paternity into a crime. Under standard rules, the presumption of paternity
served to preserve marriage, as we have seen. Today, by permitting what
has come to be known as “paternity fraud,” no-fault divorce law has transformed
paternity establishment into an incentive to dissolve rather than preserve
families. Not only can an adulterous wife now end paternal authority
simply by filing for divorce, she can also (perhaps in collusion with the
biological father) collect child support from the cuckolded husband for the
children produced by the adultery.[64]
This is only one example of how the
penal consequences of marital weakening are not symmetrical. Overwhelmingly when children are
involved, the spouse on whom the penal apparatus will be brought to bear, and
who will experience the state’s growing capacity to seize children and
criminalize the involuntarily divorced, is the father.
Some believe this is
logical, and it may be inevitable. Certainly it would be appropriate if,
as popularly believed, the father is the one abandoning the marriage. In
fact, when children are involved, the divorcing parent is almost always the
mother, usually without grounds.[65]
The failure of policymakers to
accept this fact, and instead to address its symptoms, has led to ever-more
invasive measures into private life and a panoply of highly repressive
law-enforcement actions against primarily (though not exclusively) fathers. These are invariably justified to
protect and provide for women and children once the father is gone. Yet these policies create the very
fatherless homes they ostensibly assist.
They are presented as responses to alleged social problems that were not
problems only a few years ago: domestic violence, child abuse, and child
support. Significantly, no public
outcry ever demanded a government response to these claimed ills; the initiative
has come entirely from government officials and government-funded interest
groups.
Foremost among these are
feminists. For the criminalization
of divorced fathers did not come about by accident, and neither did no-fault
divorce. Growing out of the
cultural climate of the sexual revolution, it was really feminists who created
the divorce revolution. The
National Association of Women Lawyers (NAWL) claims credit for pioneering
no-fault divorce, which it describes as “the greatest project NAWL has ever
undertaken.” “By 1977,” NAWL
proudly notes, “the ideal of no-fault divorce became the guiding principle for
reform of divorce laws in the majority of states.”[66] Divorce has a long feminist pedigree,[67]
and Germaine Greer argues that the high divorce rate should be celebrated as the
major sign of feminist progress.[68]
Today, divorce liberalization continues to be promoted by feminist
activists worldwide, often unopposed as a “human rights” measure. When Spain’s socialist government came
to power in 2004, their three domestic priorities were legalized abortion,
same-sex marriage, and liberalized divorce. Turkey was forced to withdraw a proposal
to criminalize adultery by the European Union, but liberal divorce counted in
their favor.
Divorce has
actualized the radical feminist dream of political warfare against men, and
unlike other items on the feminist agenda, it has done so virtually
unchallenged. By playing upon popular and conservative sympathy for women
and children and the fear of all politicians and advocacy groups to be seen as
defending wife-beaters, child molesters, and “deadbeat dads,” the
feminist-driven divorce industry has launched, with hardly a voice of
opposition, the greatest destruction of constitutional liberties in the Western
world today. Dean Roscoe Pound has said that “the powers of the Star
Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those of our juvenile court and courts
of domestic relations.”[69]
The
Politics of Domestic Violence 
The most immediate
problem created by involuntarily divorce, that was never addressed, is how to
get the forcibly divorced spouse out of the home. When that spouse is the
father, the solution is to accuse him of domestic abuse. “It’s an easy way
to kick somebody out,” according to one family law specialist, who claims to see
at least one case a month where patently false charges are used to remove a
spouse. “You spend a night in jail almost automatically. And your
bail conditions restrict you from ever attending at the home again except to get
your goods.” One mother relates that a lawyer told her, “There’s no reason
for you to leave [your home]. Can you get him to hit you? ... If you
do that, we can have him forcibly removed from the home.”[70]
Like divorce, domestic violence has
grown into a multi-billion dollar industry and “an area of law mired in
intellectual dishonesty and injustice.”[71]
Feminists have depicted domestic violence as a political crime
perpetrated to perpetuate male power.
Yet the fact that women commit domestic violence equally often has been
established in numerous studies.[72]
More important than achieving gender balance, however, is to understand how the
huge growth in domestic violence accusations is connected almost entirely with
family dissolution and disputes over child custody.[73]
The very concept of
“domestic violence” has never been clearly defined. Governments throughout
the United States treat it not as a form of violent assault, but as a conflict,
again, within an “intimate relationship.” It therefore blurs the
distinction between crime and disagreement and need not be either violent or
criminal. Official definitions include “extreme jealousy and
possessiveness,” “name calling and constant criticizing,” and “ignoring,
dismissing, or ridiculing the victim’s needs.”[74]
Accusations are not constrained by
due process of law. “With child
abuse and spouse abuse you don’t have to prove anything,” the leader of a legal
seminar tells divorcing mothers, according to one account. “You just have to accuse.”[75]
Parents accused during divorce are not usually formally charged, tried, or
convicted, because evidence against them usually does not exist. Yet the
accusation alone will usually prohibit a father’s contact with his children.[76]
Restraining orders are routinely
issued during divorce proceedings, usually without any evidence of
wrongdoing. “Restraining orders and
orders to vacate are granted to virtually all who apply,” and “the facts have
become irrelevant,” according to Elaine Epstein, former president of the
Massachusetts Women’s Bar Association.
“In virtually all cases, no notice, meaningful hearing, or impartial
weighing of evidence is to be had.”[77]
Bypassing due process protections is so routine that New Jersey judge Richard
Russell told his colleagues during a training seminar, “Your job is not to
become concerned about the constitutional rights of the man that you’re
violating as you grant a restraining order. Throw him out on the
street.... We don’t have to worry about the rights.”[78]
The close link
between domestic violence and marital-family dissolution is seen in the practice
of arresting fathers for attending public events such as their children’s
musical recitals, sports activities, or church services — events any stranger
may attend and where abuse cannot occur without witnesses and intervention.
Even accidental contact in public places is punished with arrest. Fathers
are arrested for sending their children birthday and Christmas cards and for
returning their telephone calls.[79]
More than simply an excess of zeal,
we see here the political logic of involuntary divorce working itself out. A forcibly divorced parent who runs into
his children in public is threatening the very principle of unilateral divorce.
Some argue that judges must balance
the rights of accused men with the need of women for protection.[80] Yet elsewhere the criminal justice
system operates on the principle that people are punished for crimes they
commit, not for what someone says they might commit. A defendant charged with the most
heinous violent crime “has all his or her rights preserved and carefully guarded
when before a court,” says Massachusetts attorney Gregory Hession. In domestic abuse cases, by contrast, “a
defendant may lose all those things, with no due process at all. ... The abuse
law throws out all of those protections.”[81] According to the New Jersey family
court, to allow accused abusers the due process protections afforded other
criminal defendants “perpetuates the cycle of power and control whereby the
[alleged?] perpetrator remains the one with the power and the [alleged?] victim
remains powerless.” Omitting the
word “alleged” is standard in federal and state statutes and media reports, and
“the mere allegation of domestic abuse...may shift the burden of proof to the
defendant.”[82]
David Heleniak identifies six separate denials of due process in the New Jersey
statute, which he terms “a due process fiasco.”[83]
Some insist that protective orders
are issued on the principle of “better safe than sorry.”[84] Yet it is not clear precisely how
protective orders can prevent violence, since violent assault is already
illegal. One father was “enjoined
and restrained from committing any domestic violence” upon his wife.[85] But is he not already thus restrained,
along with the rest of us? Clearly
the orders are issued not to prevent violence, but to remove fathers and enforce
divorce.
It is also likely
that forcing parents to stay away from their children provokes precisely the
violence it ostensibly aims to prevent. “Few lives, if any, have been
saved, but much harm, and possibly loss of lives, has come from the issuance of
restraining orders and the arrests and conflicts ensuing therefrom,” writes
retired Judge Milton Raphaelson of Dudley, Massachusetts, District Court.
“This is not only my opinion; it is the opinion of many who remain quiet due to
the political climate. Innocent men and their children are deprived of
each other.”[86]
More totalitarian still are new
“integrated domestic violence courts,” whose mandate is less to dispense
impartial justice than, in the words of one feminist judge, to “make batterers
and abusers take responsibility for their actions.”[87] Walter Fox, a Toronto lawyer, describes
similar Canadian courts as “pre-fascist”:
“Domestic violence courts...are designed to get around the protections of
the Criminal Code. The burden of
proof is reduced or removed, and there’s no presumption of innocence.”[88] Special courts to try special crimes
that can only be committed by certain people are a familiar totalitarian device
to replace impartial justice with ideological justice. New courts created during Terror of the
French Revolution were consciously imitated in the Soviet Union. In Hitler’s
Volksgerichte or people’s courts,
“only expediency in terms of National Socialist standards served as a basis for
judgment.” Forced confessions, made
famous by the Stalinist show trials, are extracted in jurisdictions like Warren
County, Pennsylvania, where fathers are summarily incarcerated unless they sign
confessions stating, “I have physically and emotionally battered my
partner.” The documents require
fathers to state, “I am responsible for the violence I used. My behavior was not provoked.”[89] The words of Friedrich and Brzezinski
seem apposite: “Confessions are the
key to this psychic coercion. The
inmate is subjected to a constant barrage of propaganda and ever-repeated
demands that he ‘confess his sins,’ that he ‘admit his shame.’”[90]
The
Politics of Child Abuse 
Closely connected is the child abuse
machinery, which has similarly weakened not only parent-child bonds, but civil
liberties through procedures for removing children from not only fathers, but
also mothers and intact families without due process protections. This too is connected with the apparatus
administering divorce.
Like domestic violence programs,
child protection procedures blur the distinction between therapy and law
enforcement, allowing social workers to exercise police functions. “Although spoken of in terms of social
services,” writes Susan Orr, “the child-protection function of child welfare is
essentially a police action.” Orr
calls child protection “the most intrusive arm of social services.”[91] Indeed, social workers appear to act not
only as police, but as judge and jury as well. In cases studied by Ralph Underwager and
Holida Wakefield, “the decision as to whether the abuse was factual was made by
custody evaluators and child protection workers rather than by the justice
system.”[92] A presumption of guilt
similar to that characterizing domestic violence policy pervades the “child
abuse industry,” as one social worker calls it. “When I started working, we tried to
prove a family was innocent,” she recounts. “Now we assume they are guilty until
they prove they are not.”[93] In
Massachusetts, child abuse is “substantiated” not by a court, but by the
Department of Social Services (DSS), which issues letters stating, “At least one
person said you were responsible for the incident and there was no available
information to definitively indicate otherwise.”[94]
Outbreaks of child abuse hysteria
during the 1980s and 1990s resulted in some forty instances of parents losing
their children and being criminalized as a result of accusations that were never
proven or have since been disproved.[95]
Even today, it is not clear that the hysteria has subsided and may have
simply become institutionalized. Of
the three million reports of child abuse annually, about two million are never
substantiated.[96] Critics allege
that innocent parents are harassed because of anonymous tips and that children
are unnecessarily taken from loving parents who have done nothing wrong.[97] “There is an antifamily bias that
pervades the policies and practices of the child welfare system,” according to
Jane Knitzer of the Children’s Defense Fund. “Children are inappropriately removed
from their families.”[98] Other
practitioners and scholars allege that children are removed unnecessarily from
parents in “staggering proportions.”
A California commission concluded that “the state’s foster care system
runs contrary to the preservation of families by unnecessarily removing an
increasing number of children from their homes each year.”[99]
Some suggest that bureaucratic aggrandizement fueled by federal funding have
created “a new class of professionals — social workers, therapists, foster care
providers, family court lawyers — who have a vested interest in taking over
parental function.”[100]
Statistically, child abuse in intact
two-parent families is rare; the vast majority takes place in single-parent
homes.[101] Accusations against
intact families and removals effected without formal charges and evidentiary
hearings are therefore especially questionable. But larger questions arise about
instances even of confirmed abuse, questions once again about the father’s
presence, which constitutes the single greatest disincentive to abuse.[102] “The presence of the father...placed the
child at lesser risk for child sexual abuse,” concludes one of the few studies
willing to state this undisputed fact explicitly.[103] Even allowing that many child removals
may be justified, therefore, public policy is still creating the environment
conducive to the abuse used to justify the removals from the mostly single
mothers by first removing fathers.[104]
The heart of the child abuse and foster care crises, therefore, is
marital dissolution or non-formation.
This also highlights another
connection with divorce. Many
unsubstantiated reports are made by one parent against the other, usually the
father, during divorce proceedings.
Some 75-80% of allegations made during divorce are “completely
false.”[105]
Yet these allegations are routinely used to remove fathers from their children’s
homes, again creating the environment most likely to result in abuse. “The
system appears to reward a parent who initiates such a complaint...and the
alleged perpetrator has been denied any contact with his children,” reports a
San Diego Grand Jury investigation. “Some of these involve allegations
which are so incredible that authorities should have been deeply concerned for
the protection of the child from the contaminating parent.” Moreover, officials
have a vested interest in encouraging these allegations. “The social
workers and therapists played pivotal roles in condoning this contamination”
through false accusations, charged the Grand Jury. “They were helped by
judges and referees.”[106]
Despite undisputed
facts about the protective value of intact families with fathers, the habits of
child protective officials seems to be to further marginalize them.
Underwager and Wakefield conclude that “an anti-male attitude is often found in
documents, statements, and in the writings of those claiming to be experts in
cases of child sexual abuse.” They document techniques by social service
agencies to systematically teach children to hate their fathers, including
inculcating that the father has sexually molested them. “The professionals
use techniques that teach children a negative and critical view of men in
general and fathers in particular,” they write. “The child is repeatedly
reinforced for fantasizing throwing Daddy in jail and is trained to hate and
fear him.”[107]
The political
interconnection between child protection and marital weakening, divorce, and
domestic violence programs is indicated by married mothers who report being not
only encouraged but pressured, on pain of losing their children, to separate
from their husbands. One publicized case involved Heidi Howard, ordered by
the Massachusetts DSS to take out a restraining order against her husband and
divorce him. When she refused, the DSS seized her children, placed them in
foster care, and began adoption proceedings. Neither parent was ever
charged with abuse or any other legal infraction.[108]
It appears the child
abuse system has allowed a variety of government agencies to operate what
amounts to a traffic in children. The San Diego Grand Jury reports “a
widely held perception within the community and even within some areas of the
Department [of Social Services] that the Department is in the ‘baby brokering’
business.”[109]
These political dynamics also
suggest one possible consequence of same-sex marriage that has been
ignored. Most discussion has
centered on questions of children’s welfare versus the rights of
homosexuals.[110] Few have questioned
where gay parents obtain their children.
Granting gay couples the right to raise children by definition means
giving at least one of the partners the right to have someone else’s children,
and the question arises whether the original parent or parents ever agreed to
part with them or did something to warrant losing them. Current law governing divorce, domestic
violence, and child abuse render this question open. The explosion of the foster care system
and the assumed, but unexamined, need to find permanent homes for supposedly
abused children has provided perhaps the strongest argument in favor of gay
parenting.[111] Yet the politics of
child abuse and divorce indicate that this assumption is not necessarily valid,
even among heterosexual adoptions.
Introducing same-sex marriage and adoption into the existing political
structure governing family policy could dramatically increase the demand for
children to adopt, thus intensifying pressure on social service agencies and
biological parents to supply such children. While sperm donors and surrogate mothers
supply some children for gay parents, in practice most are already taken from
their natural parents for various reasons.
Massachusetts Senator Therese Murray, claiming that 40% of adoptions have
gone to gay and lesbian couples, urges sympathy for “children who have been
neglected, abandoned, abused by their own families.”[112] But it is not self-evident that these
children are in fact victims of their own parents. What seems inescapable is that the very
issue of gay parenting has arisen as the direct and perhaps inevitable
consequence once government officials got into the business — which began
largely with welfare and divorce — of distributing other people’s
children.
Fueling
the Machinery: The Role of Child Support 
The other dilemma raised by
involuntary divorce — also now manifest in today’s marriage controversies — was
how to finance the increased costs it inevitably brought. The solution was child support, which
provides financial incentives to weaken marriage and sever the ties between
children and parents, particularly fathers.
Like most of the government
machinery now used to administer divorce, child support grew directly out of
welfare. It was designed not for
middle-class divorced families, but for welfare families that had never been
formed through marriage in the first place. Its justification was to recover welfare
costs and save public revenue. (In
fact, it has consistently lost money, with a current annual deficit approaching
$3 billion.)[113] In fact, the
subsequent experience might well be seen as a vindication of prophecies that a
quasi-socialistic welfare state would inevitably create a “road to
serfdom.”
Though the social consequences of
mass fatherlessness have been apparent for decades in welfare-dependent
communities, thanks to the 1965 Moynihan Report, the political implications for
freedom were not as apparent as they are now becoming with middle-class
divorce. Because most low-income
parents were not living together (which welfare discouraged), there was seldom a
need to forcibly evict the father.
Employing law-enforcement methods to coerce him to provide for the family
was also readily justified, both because his children were receiving welfare and
because he was not residing in the home where he could provide for his children
as he saw fit. The fact that often
he had not made a formal lifetime commitment to the family through marriage no
doubt also contributed to the moral case for coercive action against him. No distinction was recognized between
fathers who shirked their responsibilities and those who accepted them. Similar to the status later afforded to
involuntarily divorced spouses, the unmarried father was treated as “guilty” of
paternity and subject to the penal system.
Having erected this machinery to
coerce relatively small sums from low-income fathers, where marriage had not
taken place, the welfare agencies then extended their jurisdiction to
middle-class fathers, whose marriages had to be — and because of no-fault
divorce, now could be — forcibly dissolved by court action and where much more
substantial sums were available. As
with no-fault divorce, no public debate preceded a massive expansion in the
scope of state power over family finances and private family life.[114]
It was already known that welfare
payments to low-income mothers result in increased divorce (before it led them
to forego marriage altogether).[115] Child support added a dimension of law
enforcement and forced the middle-class father, as Jed Abraham puts it, “to
finance the filching of his own children.”[116] Child support thus became an “unintended
economic incentive for middle-class women to seek divorce”: “Strong
enforcement...may, in fact, lead to...the unintended consequence of increasing
the likelihood of divorce.”[117]
“Deadbeat dads” are another of those
public malefactors whose crimes are so repugnant that innocence is no
excuse. Yet no government agency
has ever produced any scientific evidence that there is, or ever has been, a
problem of parents not supporting their children other than that created by the
government. Psychologist Sanford
Braver, in the largest federally funded study ever undertaken on the subject,
conclusively demonstrated that the “deadbeat dad” is largely a government
creation. Described by
FrontPageMagazine as “the most important work of conservative social science in
a decade,”[118] Braver’s study showed
that the child support “crisis” consists of little more than the government
separating children from their fathers, imposing patently impossible debts on
fathers who have done nothing to incur those debts, and then arresting those
who, quite predictably, cannot pay.
His research undermined every justification for the multi-billion dollar
criminal enforcement machinery. Yet
eight years after Braver’s book, no enforcement agency has responded to his
findings.
Others have
confirmed them. William Comanor and a team of scholars have documented the
faulty economics. Ronald Henry calls the system and its rationalization
“an obvious sham,” “the most onerous form of debt collection practiced in the
United States,” and one “that is matched nowhere else in [the] legal system.”[119]
The consequences are corrosive of
not only family stability, but constitutional protections. Bryce Christensen argues for a “linkage
between aggressive child-support policies and the erosion of wedlock” and
writes, “the advocates of ever-more-aggressive measures for collecting child
support have trampled on the prerogatives of local government, have moved us a
dangerous step closer to a police state, and have violated the rights of
innocent and often impoverished fathers.”[120]
Abraham writes that “the government commands an extensive enforcement apparatus,
a veritable gulag, complete with sophisticated surveillance and compliance
capabilities such as computer-based tracing, license revocation, asset
confiscation, and incarceration. The face of this regime is decidedly
Orwellian.”[121]
Like domestic violence and child
abuse measures, child support enforcement is governed by an explicit presumption
of guilt, wherein the accused must prove his innocence. “The burden of proof may be shifted to
the defendant,” according to an approving legal analysis by the National
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL).
Further, “not all child support contempt proceedings classified as
criminal are entitled to a jury trial,” and “even indigent obligors are not
necessarily entitled to a lawyer.”[122]
A father who has lost his children through literally “no fault” of his
own must prove his innocence without a formal charge, without counsel, and
without facing a jury of his peers.
Child support enforcement further
blurs the distinction between guilt and innocence, since officials monitor
parents with arrearages, those whose payments are current, and even citizens who
are not under an order. The
presumption of guilt against those obeying the law was revealed by one official
who boasted that “we don’t give them an opportunity to become deadbeats” and by
former Attorney General Janet Reno, who referred to current payments “collected
from deadbeat parents,” branding as criminals parents who do pay.[123]
The presumption that not only all parents under child support orders are already
quasi-criminals, but all citizens are potential criminals against whom
pre-emptive enforcement measures must be initiated now in anticipation of their
future criminality, is revealed by NCSL, which justifies collecting names from
the general population by saying, “At one point or another, many people will
either be obligated to pay or eligible to receive child support.”[124]
The role of child support in
undermining marriage also explains why the fatherhood and marriage promotion
measures of the last two administrations have achieved little and why they may
be exacerbating the problem.
During the 1990s, the Clinton
administration and other governments initiated programs to “promote
fatherhood.” Despite the professed
(and possibly quite sincere) aim of extolling the importance of fathers and the
need to reconnect them with their children, in practice these programs
themselves often ended up serving as justifications for collecting child
support. The result, therefore, was
somewhat opposite of what was
advertised, since the federal government was promoting fatherhood with
one hand while subsidizing divorce and fatherless homes financially with the
other.
Under the Bush administration, the
emphasis shifted from fatherhood to marriage. Yet the substance remained similar. While the initiative seems likewise to
have proceeded from a genuine desire to redirect priorities toward programs that
enhance marriage, with funds devoted to marriage counseling, in practice it has
also been compromised by political pressure to continue the essentially punitive
approach to family dissolution dominated by the child support system. Since January 2003, some substantial
grants announced by HHS under the Healthy Marriage initiative have gone to child
support enforcement agencies and private groups involved in collection.[125]
In short, the debate about the
desirability of the government promoting marriage and fatherhood may be rendered
irrelevant by the fact that the programs are not always what they appear. Whatever the merits of programs
encouraging marriage formation, it is not clear that these disbursements even
can achieve the desired goal. It is
more likely that by expanding programs that are predicated on the removal of the
father from the home, the federal funds are undermining marriage rather than
encouraging it. Whatever one’s
sympathies, on both sides the public debate over government marriage programs
has been somewhat beside the point.
Unintended Consequences 
Similar uncertainty
seems to operate with proposed federal action over same-sex marriage. It
is not clear that a constitutional amendment defining marriage in terms of its
gender component can, in itself, achieve the aims of its proponents, either by
strengthening marriage or even preventing same-sex unions. Ignoring the
larger legal status and political definition of marriage could result in a
constitutional Maginot Line. As one sympathetic columnist predicts, “Even
if Republicans were to succeed in constitutionally defining marriage as a
relationship between a man and a woman, some judge somewhere would soon discover
a novel meaning for ‘man’ or ‘woman’ or ‘between’ or ‘relationship’ or any of
the other dozen words that might appear in the amendment.”[126]
This is already happening in custody
cases involving transsexuals. “Some
jurisdictions prefer to remain in the nineteenth-century understanding of binary
sex that saw male and female as distinct, immutable, and opposite,” states
Florida Judge Gerald O’Brien, who suggests that both marriage and gender are
primarily conditions of mind.[127]
Britain’s Gender Recognition Bill now allows transsexuals to alter their
birth certificates to indicate they were born the gender of their choice. “The practical effect of the bill will
inevitably be same-sex marriage,” writes Melanie Phillips of the Daily
Mail. “‘Man’ and ‘woman’ will no longer mean anything other than
whether someone feels like a man or a woman. As a result, priests may
unwittingly marry people of the same sex.”[128]
The
Limits of Policy 
A much broader debate on marriage is
in order, one that includes the role of the state in defining and dissolving
it. To be effective, this debate
would have to include the state’s roles with respect to fatherhood, divorce,
child custody, and the very concept of private life itself. Rather than focusing on marriage as a
status conferring economic privileges on adults, a thorough debate would come to
terms with the role of marriage in guaranteeing the parent-child bond and the
private sphere of life. This
dilemma pervades every aspect of the growing family crisis and will continue to
spawn a multitude of social ills and political controversies with attendant
consequences to social order, political stability, and civil liberties.
Possibly we will conclude that
unrestricted divorce, single-parenthood, same-sex unions, and other ways of
redefining marriage and the family are valued enough as expressions of
individual freedom that we are willing to break with past legal principle and
accept that this bond is no longer sacrosanct. If so, it is only fair that this
decision be made consciously and openly, so that prospective parents are aware
in advance that any children they create may be taken from them through
literally “no fault” of their own.
Yet it is far from clear that such a
consensus exists. As recently as
2000, the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that “parental rights are
absolute”: “The interest of parents
in the care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court,” the court stated. “The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”[129] If we still value this principle, then
it must be applied consistently, for current family law has rendered it empty
verbiage, leaving parents and children in limbo, the law vulnerable to contempt,
and our social order in increasing disarray.
How might this be effected? Many argue that successful
constitutional amendments serve to protect citizens’ rights, and even some
opponents of same-sex marriage question whether they can effectively be used to
enact public policy. Constitutions
traditionally limit the state rather than the citizenry, whose actions are more
appropriately controlled by statute.
Accepting this principle for the
sake of argument, it could be employed to strengthen marriage and the family
without intrusive social engineering.
Granting that the Constitution does need an amendment protecting family
integrity from pressures that could not have been anticipated two hundred years
ago, a more direct and comprehensive approach may be an amendment that
guarantees the privacy and civil inviolability of the family and codifies
traditional rights of parents to the care and custody of their children and to
direct their upbringing free from arbitrary state interference. From homeschoolers to victims of
questionable child abuse accusations to parents whose children are put on
psychotropic drugs without their consent to divorced fathers, it is parents —
not gay parents, but parents generally — who are being besieged by an
increasingly repressive state apparatus and denied basic due process
protections. Such a provision would
address a problem recognized by both the left and right,[130] it would carry no
hint of excluding any group, and it would be relatively impervious to judicial
casuistry.
If we are to shift the terms of
debate from the needs of children to the rights of adults to marry one another
and form unions for the purpose of bringing up what must inevitably be someone
else’s children, it seems only fair to ensure that this not be done at the
expense of traditional protections for biological parents when it comes to
raising their own. The
politicization of children in many venues and the disproportionate attention to
the conjugal and parental claims of politically vocal groups — with virtually
none to millions of unorganized parents who have experienced the confiscation of
their own flesh and blood — starkly demonstrates that family law and politics
today by no means guarantees that natural parents will not have their children
taken away to supply children for groups with political influence. This is precisely what is now
happening. It is just one
illustration of why a debate on parenthood — and on marriage as a status that
protects it — would be a debate on the substance of marriage rather than the
word.
If Chesterton was correct about the
private family being the principal check on official power, then the very
concept of “family policy” may inevitably carry the curse of Midas, wherein that
which the state touches, almost by definition, it must destroy. It is not difficult to see why scholars
like Wilson give up hope of ever finding a solution to the ills of the
family. Yet the way to cut this
Gordian Knot may be not to mobilize public policy at all, but instead to limit
it. And that is precisely what the
Constitution is for.
Endnotes:
1 Gary M.
Segura, “A Symposium on the Politics of Same-Sex Marriage — An Introduction
and Commentary,” and other articles in PS: Political Science and Politics,
vol. 38, no. 2 (April 2005); Jyl Josephson, “Citizenship, Same-Sex Marriage,
and Feminist Critiques of Marriage,” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 3,
no. 2 (June 2005).
2 Ibid.,
270, 276.
3 James Q.
Wilson, “Why We Don’t Marry,” City Journal, Winter 2002.
4 Josephson,
“Citizenship,” 270.
5 Bryce
Christensen, “Divided We Fall: America’s Second Civil War,” The Family in
America, vol. 17, no 10 (October 2003).
6 G.K.
Chesterton, The Superstition of Divorce (1920, various editions), chap.
5, “The Story of the Family,” and Divorce versus Democracy (1916,
various editions).
7 Matt Daniels,
“Marriage, Society,” Washington Times, 15 April 2004 (http://www.washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20040414-090033-8998r.htm).
8 Jonah
Goldberg, “No Angels,” National Review Online, 23 July 2004 (http://www.nationalreview.com/goldberg/
goldberg200407230847.asp).
9 “The Politics
of Family,” American Prospect, 8 April 2002; “Get Me to the Church on
Time,” Economist, 10 July 2003, 29.
10 “Wedded to
Marriage,” National Review Online, 9 August 2005 (http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/horn200508090806.asp).
11 Lynn Wardle,
“Multiply and Replenish: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State
Interests in Marital Procreation,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy
24 (2001), 777-778.
12 Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
13 Susan Shell,
“The Liberal Case Against Gay Marriage,” The Public Interest 156
(Summer 2004), 7.
14 Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); May v. Anderson, 345
U.S. 528, 533 (1953); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1971);
Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57 (2000). See Donald C. Hubin,
“Parental Rights and Due Process,” Journal of Law and Family Studies,
vol. 1, no. 2 (1999).
15 Langton
v. Maloney, 527 F. Supp. 538, D.C. Conn. (1981).
16 Quoted in Bruce
C. Hafen, “Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations
about Abandoning Youth to Their ‘Rights,’” Brigham Young University Law
Review (1976), no. 3, 615-616.
17 Shell, “Liberal
Case,” 5-6.
18 Margaret Mead,
Male and Female: A Study of the Sexes in a Changing World (New York:
Dell, 1969), 198.
19 Cp. Lynn Wardle,
“The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children,” University of
Illinois Law Review (1997), part IV.
20 Josephson,
“Citizenship,” 275.
21 Leon R. Kass,
“The End of Courtship,” internet site of The Public Interest (http://www.thepublicinterest.com;
no date; accessed 26 March 2002).
22 Thomas Hobbes,
Leviathan, part II, chap. 20 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), 254
(emphasis added).
23 Frederick
Pollack and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law (2d
edn., 1968), 398-399.
24 Department of
Health and Human Services Internet site: http://ocse.acf.hhs.gov/necsrspub/federal/dcl/topic.cfm?TOPIC=Establishment%20of%20Paternity.
25 William J.
Doherty, “The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Fathering as a Contested
Arena of Academic Discourse,” in Alan J. Hawkins and David C. Dollahite
(eds.), Generative Fathering: Beyond Deficit Perspectives (1997),
217-218.
26 Maggie
Gallagher, “(How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution,”
University of St. Thomas Law Journal, vol. 2, no. 1 (Fall 2004), 56-57.
27 Lynn Wardle,
“Multiply and Replenish.”
28 Josephson,
“Citizenship,” 270 (emphasis added).
29 Wendy McElroy,
“It’s Time to Privatize Marriage,” Foxnews.com, 16 July 2002 (http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,57749,00.html); Michael Kinsley, “Abolish Marriage,” Washington
Post, 3 July 2003.
30 “The Case for
Gay Marriage,” The Economist, 26 February 2004 (editorial).
31 Maggie
Gallagher, “The Divorce Thing,” National Review Online, 13 August 2003
(http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/ comment-gallagher081303.asp).
32 Jonathan Rauch,
“What I Learned at AEI,” The Public Interest 156 (Summer 2004), 19.
33 Froma Harrop,
“What God Has Joined, Let No Man...” Providence Journal, 26 November
2003.
34 Michael McManus,
“Is Gay Marriage Next?” (syndicated column), 12 July 2003 (http://www.marriagesavers.org/Columns/C1141.htm).
35 Frederick Liu
and Stephen Macedo, “The Federal Marriage Amendment and the Strange Evolution
of the Conservative Case Against Gay Marriage,” PS: Political Science and
Politics, vol. 38, no. 2 (April 2005), 212-213.
36 Bryce
Christensen, “Why Homosexuals Want What Marriage Has Now Become,” The
Family in America, vol. 18, no. 4 (April 2004).
37 Andrew Sullivan,
“Unveiled: The Case Against Same-Sex Marriage Crumbles,” New Republic,
13 August 2001 (http://www.andrewsullivan.com/homosexuality.php?artnum=20010813,
accessed 10 September 2004; emphasis added); Stephenie Coontz, “The
Heterosexual Revolution,” New York Times, 5 July 2005 (emphasis added).
38 Josephson,
“Citizenship,” 271.
39 Barbara Dafoe
Whitehead, The Divorce Culture (New York: Vintage, 1998), 7.
40 Maggie
Gallagher, The Abolition of Marriage (Washington, DC: Regnery), 245.
41 Tunku
Varadarajan, “Clash With the Titans,” Wall Street Journal online
edition, 30 January 2002, (http://opinionjournal.com/
columnists/tvaradarajan/?id=95001795).
42 David G.
Schramm, “The Costly Consequences of Divorce in Utah: The Impact on Couples,
Communities, and Government”; forthcoming: preliminary data as of 25 June
2003, Department of Family, Consumer, and Human Development, Utah State
University (http://www.utahmarriage.org/index.cfm?id=17htV59n28,
accessed 10 October 2004).
43 Helen Alvare,
“Types and Styles of Family Proceedings,” Report of the United States to
the XII World Congress, International Association of Procedural Law, 2003,
1, cautiously cites the lower figure. Stephen Safranek of Ave Maria
University Law School has informal evidence for the higher figure.
44 Stephen
Baskerville, “The Politics of Fatherhood,” PS: Political Science and
Politics, vol. 35, no. 4 (December 2002), drawing upon Jerome R. Corsi,
Judicial Politics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1984),
107-114, and Richard A. Watson and Rondal G. Downing, The Politics of the
Bench and the Bar (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1969), 98, 336.
45 Herbert Jacob,
Justice in America: Courts, Lawyers, and the Judicial Process (4th
edn., Boston and Toronto: Little Brown, 1984), 112.
46 David
Blankenhorn, Fatherless America: Confronting Our Most Urgent Social Problem
(New York: Basic Books, 1995); David Popenoe, Life Without Father (New
York: Free Press, 1996), chap. 2. For studies controlling for poverty, see
Urie Bronfenbrenner, “Discovering What Families Do,” in David Blankenhorn,
Steven Bayme, and Jean Bethke Elshtain (eds.), Rebuilding the Next: A New
Commitment to the American Family (Milwaukee: Family Service America,
1990).
47 Quoted in Sean
E. Brotherson and Jeffrey B. Teichert, “Value of the Law in Shaping Social
Perspectives on Marriage,” Journal of Law and Family Studies, vol. 3,
no. 1 (2001), 51.
48 Gallagher,
Abolition of Marriage, 144.
49 Glenda Riley,
Divorce: An American Tradition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991),
6.
50 Frank E.
Furstenberg, Jr. and Andrew J. Cherlin, Divided Families: What Happens to
Children When Parents Part (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1991), 22.
51 Whitehead,
Divorce Culture, 70-71.
52 Judy Parejko,
“No Fair Process in Divorce Laws,” Middletown Journal, 27 January 2004.
53 McLarnon
v. Jokisch, 431 Mass. 343 (2000).
54 Hubin, “Parental
Rights,” 136.
55 Karen Selick,
“The Spouse Trap,” National Post, 24 May 1999.
56 Gallagher,
“(How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage,” 41-42.
57 Principles of
the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations (Philadelphia:
American Law Institute, 2002). Josephson’s point (“Citizenship,” 270) that
the privacy of marriage is “not accorded to those who do not or may not marry”
seems strange therefore. Cohabiting couples have enjoyed privacy denied by
divorce law to the married, which is precisely what ALI seeks to curtail.
58 The Future of
Family Law: Law and the Marriage Crisis in North America (New York: Institute
for American Values, 2005).
59 Parham v.
J.R. a Minor, 422 US 584, 602 (1979).
60 Robert G.
Williams, “An Overview of Child Support Guidelines in the United States,” in
Margaret Campbell Haynes (ed.), Child Support Guidelines: The Next
Generation (Washington: Office of Child Support Enforcement, April 1994),
2.
61 Ann Crittenden,
The Price of Motherhood: Why the Most Important Job in the World is Still
the Least Valued (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001), 25.
62 Allan Carlson,
“A Culture of Marriage: Two Tales,” The Family in America, vol. 17, no.
12 (December 2003), 2, 4.
63 Josephson,
“Citizenship,” 275-276.
64 Ana
Veciana-Suarez, “Not His Biological Child, But Still His Child to Support,”
Knight Ridder News Service, 22 December 2005; Douglas Richardson, “Man Forced
to Pay Child Support to the Biological Father of His Wife’s Child,” Alliance
for Noncustodial Parents’ Rights Web site (www.ancpr.org), 25 January
2006.
65 Margaret F.
Brinig and Douglas W. Allen, “These Boots Are Made for Walking: Why Most
Divorce Filers are Women,” American Economics and Law Review, vol. 2,
issue 1 (Spring 2000); Judith Wallerstein and Sandra Blakeslee, Second
Chances: Men, Women, and Children a Decade After Divorce (New York:
Ticknor and Fields, 1989), 39.
66 National
Association of Women Lawyers Internet site: http://www.abanet.org/nawl/
about/history.html, accessed 6 November 2004.
67 Whitehead,
Divorce Culture, 15-16, 26.
68 Amanda Banks,
“Greer Cheers Divorcing Women,” The Australian, 8 September 2004.
69 David Heleniak,
“The New Star Chamber,” Rutgers Law Review, vol. 57, no. 3 (Spring
2005), 1009.
70 Quoted in Donna
Laframboise, “Oh Dad, Poor Dad,” Toronto Globe and Mail, 12 April 1997,
D1-2.
71 Heleniak, “New
Star Chamber,” 1009.
72 Philip W. Cook,
Abused Men: The Hidden Side of Domestic Violence (Westport,
Connecticut: Praeger, 1997); John Archer, “Sex Differences in Aggression
Between Heterosexual Partners: A Meta-Analytic Review,” Psychological
Bulletin, vol. 26, no. 5 (September 2000), 651-680; Martin S. Fiebert,
“References Examining Assaults by Women on Their Spouses or Male Partners: An
Annotated Bibliography,” Sexuality and Culture, vol. 8, no. 3-4 (2004),
140-177.
73 Anne McMurray,
“Violence Against Ex-Wives: Anger and Advocacy,” Health Care for Women
International, vol. 18, no. 6 (November-December 1997); Callie Marie
Rennison and Sarah Welchans, Intimate Partner Violence (Washington, DC:
US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, May 2000, NCJ 178247),
5.
74 Grace Coleman,
et al., (eds.), 1999 National Victim Assistance Academy, chap.
8, “Domestic Violence.” (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
ovc/assist/nvaa99/chap8.htm; 16 January 2000).
75 Eric Zorn, “A
Seminar In Divorce, Down-And-Dirty Style,” Chicago Tribune, 4 November
1988, 1.
76 Ross D. Parke
and Armin A. Brott, Throwaway Dads: The Myths and Barriers That Keep Men
from Being the Fathers They Want to Be (Boston and New York: Houghton
Mifflin, 1999), 49-50.
77 Elaine Epstein,
“Speaking the Unspeakable,” Massachusetts Bar Association Newsletter 33
(June-July 1993), 1.
78 Russ Bleemer,
“N.J. Judges Told to Ignore Rights in Abuse TROs,” New Jersey Law Journal
140, 24 April 1995.
79 Cathy Young,
Ceasefire: Why Women and Men Must Join Forces to Achieve True Equality
(New York: Free Press, 1999), 127.
80 Kathleen Parker,
“Fathers’ Group Seeks to Right Inequities,” Orlando Sentinel, 12
September 1999.
81 Press release
from Law Office of Attorney Gregory A. Hession, JD, 30 July 2001 (http://www.massoutrage.com/rodirtytricks.htm,
accessed 18 October 2002).
82 Miriam Altman,
“Litigating Domestic Abuse Cases under Ch. 209A,” Massachusetts Lawyers
Weekly, 23 October 1995, B6.
83 Heleniak, “New
Star Chamber,” 1036-1037, 1042.
84 Cathy Young,
“Hitting Below the Belt,” Salon, 25 October 1999,
http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/1999/ 10/25/restraining_orders/index.html.
85 Stephen C.
Schroeder, and David A. Sharp, “Fathers Also Deserve Legal Protection Against
Abuse,” St. Petersburg Times, 28 February and 2 March 1992.
86 Milton
Raphaelson, “Time to Revisit Abuse Statute,” Western Massachusetts Law
Tribune, 18 April 2001.
87 Quoted in Frank
Donnelly, “Domestic Violence Court to Debut,” Staten Island Advance, 14
December 2003.
88 Quoted in Dave
Brown, “Skirmish Fails to Scratch the Formidable Feminist War Machine,”
Ottawa Citizen, 9 April 2002.
89 Documents in the
author’s possession.
90 Carl Friedrich
and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1965), 216, 195.
91 Susan Orr,
Child Protection at the Crossroads: Child Abuse, Child Protection, and
Recommendations for Reform (Los Angeles: Reason Public Policy Institute,
October 1999), 10-12.
92 “Personality
Characteristics of Parents Making False Accusations of Sexual Abuse in Custody
Cases,” Issues in Child Abuse Accusations, vol. 2, no. 3 (Summer 1990),
121-136 (http://www.ipt-forensics.com/journal/ volume2/j2_3_1.htm).
93 “Testimony of
Christopher J. Klicka, Senior Counsel of the Home School Legal Defense
Association... House Committee on Education and the Workforce,” 16 October
2001 (http://nche.hslda.org/docs/link.asp?URL=
http%3A%2F%2Fedworkforce%2Ehouse%2Egov%2Fhearings%2F107th%2Fsed%2Fcapta101701%2Fklicka%2Ehtm).
94 Richard Wexler,
Wounded Innocents: The Real Victims of the War Against Child Abuse
(Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1990), 15 (emphasis added).
95 When Child
Protection Investigations Harm Children: The Wenatchee Sexual Abuse Cases,
American Civil Liberties Union of Washington (October 1997).
96 Child
Maltreatment 1996: Reports from the States to the National Child Abuse and
Neglect Data System (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1998), p. xi.
97 Sylvia Ann
Hewlett and Cornel West, The War Against Parents: What We Can Do for
America’s Beleaguered Moms and Dads (Boston and New York: Houghton
Mifflin, 1998), chap. 4; Dana Mack, The Assault on Parenthood (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), chap. 2.
98 “Testimony of
Jane Knitzer, Children’s Defense Fund…Committee on Ways and Means, U.S.
House of Representatives,” 22 and 27 March 1979.
99 Little Hoover
Commission, For the Sake of the Children: Restructuring Foster Care in
California, Report #115, 9 April 1992, conclusion (http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhcdir/115rp.html).
100 Hewlett and West,
War Against Parents, 109.
101 Andrea J. Sedlak
and Diane D. Broadhurst, Executive Summary of the Third National Incidence
Study of Child Abuse and Neglect (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect,
September 1996), 8; Child Maltreatment 1996: Reports from the States to the
National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1998), xi-xii.
102 Robert Whelan,
Broken Homes and Battered Children: A Study of the Relationship Between Child
Abuse and Family Type (London: Family Education Trust, 1993), 29.
103 David Rowland,
et al., “Household Risk and Child Sexual Abuse in a Low Income, Urban
Sample of Women,” Adolescent and Family Health, vol. 1, no. 1 (Winter
2000), 29-39 (http://www.afhjournal.org/docs/010110.asp).
104 Patrick Fagan,
“CAPTA Successes and Failures at Preventing Child Abuse and Neglect,” Heritage
Foundation website (http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/ Test080201.cfm),
21August 2001.
105 Parke and Brott,
Throwaway Dads, 39; Holida Wakefield and Ralph Underwager, “Sexual Abuse
Allegations in Divorce and Custody Disputes,” Behavioral Sciences and the
Law 9 (1991), 451-468; Holida Wakefield and Ralph Underwager,
“Personality Characteristics of Parents Making False Accusations of Sexual
Abuse in Custody Cases,” Issues in Child Abuse Accusations, vol. 2, no.
3 (Summer 1990), 121-136 (http://www.ipt-forensics.com/journal/volume2/j2_3_1.htm).
106 “Families in
Crisis,” report by the 1991-92 San Diego County Grand Jury, 8, 10.
107 Ralph Underwager
and Hollida Wakefield, The Real World of Child Interrogations
(Springfield, Illinois, Charles C. Thomas, 1990), 127.
108 Ed Oliver, “Why Was
Mother Shackled for Not Giving Baby to Strangers?” Massachusetts News,
20 February 2001; interviews with the principals.
109 “Families in
Crisis,” 9.
110 Eric Zorn and Allan
Carlson, “A Primer on the ‘Gay Marriage’ Debate,” The Family in America,
vol. 17, no. 8 (August 2003).
111 See
Lethimstay.com, ACLU Lesbian & Gay Rights Project
(http://www.lethimstay.com/ bigpicture_numbers.html, accessed 27 October
2005).
112 “The Debate on Gay
Marriage, Pro and Con,” Boston Globe online edition, 12 March 2004 (http://www.boston.com/news/specials/gay_marriage/articles/
2004/03/12/the_debate_on_gay_marriage_pro_and_con/).
113 Child Support
Enforcement (CSE) FY 2002 Preliminary Data Report, 29 April 2003, figures
1 and 2 (http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2003/reports/prelim_datareport/).
114 See “Statement
of Leslie L. Frye, Chief, Office of Child Support California Department of
Social Services Testimony...on the Administration’s Child Support Enforcement
Incentive Payment Proposal, March 20, 1997” (http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/humres/105cong/3-20-97/3-20frye.htm),
1-2.
115 Saul Hoffman and
Greg Duncan, “The Effects of Incomes, Wages, and AFDC Benefits on Marital
Disruption,” Journal of Human Resources 30 (1995), 19-41.
116 Jed Abraham, From
Courtship to Courtroom: What Divorce Law Is Doing to Marriage (New York:
Bloch, 1999), 151.
117 Kimberly Folse and
Hugo Varela-Alvarez, “Long-Run Economic Consequences of Child Support
Enforcement,” Journal of Socio-Economics, vol. 31, issue 3 (2002), 274,
283, 284.
118 Sanford L. Braver,
Divorced Dads: Shattering the Myths (New York: Tarcher/Putnam, 1998);
Robert Locke, “Deadbeat Social Scientists,” FrontPageMagazine.com, 2
July 2001 (http://frontpagemag.com/columnists/ locke/2001/locke06-29-01.htm).
119 Ronald Henry,
“Child Support Policy and the Unintended Consequences of Good Intentions,” in
W.S. Comanor (ed.), The Law and Economics of Child Support Payments
(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004), 130, 135, 139.
120 Bryce Christensen,
“The Strange Politics of Child Support,” Society, vol. 39, no. 1
(Nov.-Dec. 2001), p. 63.
121 Jed Abraham,
From Courtship to Courtroom: What Divorce Law Is Doing to Marriage (New
York: Bloch, 1999), pp. 154-155.
122 NCSL Internet site:
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/Criminalnon.htm (accessed 28 August
2001).
123 Robert O’Harrow,
“Uncle Sam Has All Your Numbers,” Washington Post, 27 June 1999, A1;
“Attorney General Reno Announces Plan to Crack Down on Dead-Beat Parents Who
Fail to Pay Child Support,” Department of Justice press release, 22 December
1994.
124 NCSL Internet site:
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/csissue.htm (accessed 24 January
2000).
125 “ACF Approves Child
Support Demonstrations in Four States,” Administration for Children and
Families press release, 29 April 2004.
126 Robert Seidenberg,
“Redefine Debate, Not Marriage,” Washington Times, 14 March 2004.
127 “Florida Court Says
No Right to Transsexual Marriage,” Catholic World News, 26 July 2004 (http://www.cwnews.com/news/viewstory.cfm?recnum=31082).
128 Melanie Phillips,
“The Sexual Identity Free-for-All,” Daily Mail, 8 March 2004.
129 Troxel v.
Granville, 530 US 57 (2000). But see Fields v. Palmdale School
District, No. 03-00457 (9th Cir., 2 Nov. 2005).
130 Hewlett and West,
War Against Parents; Mack, Assault on Parenthood |