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Europe and the
Christian Democracy Movement:
A Once and Future Hope?
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By Allan C. Carlson,
Ph.D.*
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* This essay is adapted from a lecture presented to the Witherspoon
Fellowship of the Family Research Council, Washington, DC, July 20,
2005. It appears here with permission.
Allan Carlson has served as distinguished fellow in family policy at the
Family Research Council and is president of The Howard Center in
Illinois. He holds his Ph.D. in Modern European History from The Ohio
University. His books include Fractured Generations: Crafting a Family
Policy for Twenty-first Century America and The Swedish Experiment in
Family Politics: The Myrdals and the Interwar Population Crisis. |
In August 1992, during his address to the GOP National
Convention, then-Presidential Candidate Pat Buchanan delighted his supporters
and appalled progressive Republicans when he stated:
My friends, this election is about
much more than who gets what. It is about who we are....There is a
religious war going on in our country for the soul of America. It is a
cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we will one day be as was the
Cold War itself.[1]
The term “culture war,” so often heard in our
political discourse today, popularly dates from this speech. Yet the phrase’s true origin actually
reaches back over a century and across the Atlantic. During the 1870’s, the then-new German
Empire launched a broad assault on religious liberty and family autonomy, a
campaign called kulturkampf
(translated, “culture war”).
Perhaps the most important, if unintended, result of
this original “culture war” was to encourage a still amorphous political
movement, called Christian Democracy, in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. This experiment in applying Christian
principles to popular modern governance developed its own history of triumph and
tragedy; and it offers lessons for Americans also trying — now in the 21st
Century — to apply Christianity to modern democratic politics.
A Legacy of the French
Revolution 
It is said that the 20th-Century Chinese Communist
leader Zhou Enlai (1898-1976), when asked what the impact of the 1789 French
Revolution had been on human affairs, replied: “It’s too soon to tell.”
Actually, it is unclear to whom and just when Zhou
said this. One source says it was
to the Archduke Otto van Hapsburg in 1948; another source says to Richard Nixon
in 1972; another to England’s Tony Benn in 1975; and still another to a French
journalist in 1989. The latter
could be called miraculous, for Zhou had been dead for thirteen years by
then. Perhaps Zhou, living and
dead, has simply prattled this observation out to every Westerner that he has
met.
All the same, his answer rings true. The revolutionaries of 1789 unleashed
passions and ideas that continue their work into our time. Many of them directly target religious
and family relations, including the leveling idea of equality, the divorce
revolution, secular liberalism, sexual freedom, state-centered education, and
communism. The French Revolution
also defined our modern political vocabulary: the labels “liberal,” “radical,”
“socialist,” and even “conservative” all derive from that time of ferment (for
example, it was books by Edmund Burke and Louis deBonald written in reaction to
the French Revolution that first defined modern conservatism).
So, too, for Christian Democracy, which also rose as
a somewhat delayed response to events in France. As a prominent early Christian Democrat
explained, 1789 marked “the birth year of modern life,” which he also described
as “the catastrophe of 1789.”[2]
Indeed, one of the most successful Christian Democratic parties would
take the strange name, The Anti-Revolutionary Party, in the late 1870’s, and
would retain it until just two decades ago.
The Christian Democratic
Platform 
Authentic Christian Democracy, I hasten to add, has
not been simply another name for “conservatism.” Unlike European conservatives, the
Democratic Christian goal has not been to defend the remnants of the old feudal
order, nor existing class structures, nor persons of wealth. Nor has Christian Democracy simply been
the “rural” or “country” party, defending the interests of small farmers while
ignoring the urban, industrial order.
Instead, the movement should be seen as a distinctly
Christian response to modernity, one with its own platform. To begin with, Christian Democrats have
understood the French Revolution as unleashing an “appalling anti-Christian
world power which, if Christ did not break it, would rip this whole world
forever out of the hands of its God and away from its own destiny.” According to these partisans, the
secularism spawned by the French
Revolution produced a “system of modern and almost incomprehensibly diabolical
paganism.” The movement has also
held that “it would be utterly absurd for a person to take...a confession of
Christ on [his or her] lips and ignore the consequences that flow directly from
it for our national politics.”[3]
Moreover, Christian Democracy has formally opposed
economic materialism, in both its socialist and liberal capitalist
manifestations. In this view,
Europe’s early 20th-Century disorders arose from the “exaggerated
liberal-capitalistic economic order” of the prior century. As the Christian Democratic writer Maria
Meyer-Sevenich explained:
...they [Marxism and fascism] are
nothing but powerful reactionary movements, grown out of the native soil [Mutterboden]
of the same liberal-capitalist thinking.[4]
Speaking in 1946, Josef Andre offered a Christian
Democratic interpretation of the meaning of the Nazi defeat in World War
II:
The materialistic view of history
is now at an end. What Hegel, Darwin, Haeckel, Nietzsche and Karl Marx
strove for, each from his own field of expertise, has been historically
overtaken and destroyed with the National Socialist Zeitgeist.[5]
Christian Democracy has provided, instead, a
spirit-centered, Christ-centered worldview that would build distinctive
political and economic orders.
Notably, Christian Democracy has stood for organic
society. The legacy of the French
Revolution in both politics and economics was a quest for uniformity, which
meant the suppression of diversity, the denial of “everything fresh and
natural.” Christian Democrats have
held that the spontaneous structures of human life — villages, towns,
neighborhoods, labor associations, and (above all) families — need protection
from the leveling tendencies of modernity.
Only through these organic structures, they have maintained, can the
human personality thrive. As the
French philosopher Etienne Gilson explained:
From his birth to his death, each
man is involved in a multiplicity of natural social structures outside of which
he could neither live nor achieve his full development....Each of these groups
possesses a specific organic unity; first of all, there is the family, the
child’s natural place of growth.[6]
Christian Democrats have insisted that such groups
pre-exist the state. That is, the
law does not create families and towns; it “finds them.” Accordingly, Christian Democrats have
favored tax benefits and state allowances to support marriage and the birth and
rearing of children as recognition of this prior existence of families.
As analyst Guido Dierickx explains, Christian
Democrats have also viewed the family as holding both instrumental and intrinsic
value. On the one hand, the family
is the vehicle for the regeneration of all society:
The Christian Democrats view the
(core) family as a privileged opportunity to implement their
social...principles. They want the citizens to adapt their private lives
to demanding interpersonal relationships. Family life, especially the
traditional family life of a married couple with several children, is a first
embodiment of such relationships in other sectors of society.[7]
On the other hand, Christian Democrats also have used
public policy to re-functionalize, and so strengthen, families. When they:
...would like to entrust more
health care and other social service duties to the family, they do so not just
to alleviate the burden of the state bureaucracy or of the Ministry of Finance,
or to improve the quality of the service rendered to the aged, the young and the
sick (though this too is a major consideration), but first and foremost because
they hope to strengthen the family. [They believe that] the contemporary
family is weakened by the loss of social functionality.[8]
Similarly,
Christian Democrats have sought to funnel additional modern governmental
services through other “organic” structures as well, notably “non profit” and
religious agencies. For example, in the nations of Germany and the
Netherlands, where Christian Democratic influence has been decisive, state
sectors now allocate nearly 70 percent of gross domestic product. However,
only 10 percent of this has been controlled by the central government.
Instead, non-profit agencies — particularly those with religious ties — have
provided the largest share of program implementation.[9]
Two Paths to Christian
Democracy 
In its purest form, Christian Democracy has also
aimed at Christian political unity.
The Enlightenment of the 18th Century, which spawned the ideological side
of the French Revolution, had itself emerged largely in revulsion over the
religious wars of the prior, or 17th, century. In that intolerant, bloody era,
Catholics and Protestants battled against each other. Millions died in this Christian civil
war. The modern Christian Democracy
movement has consciously worked to transcend theological differences between
Catholic and Protestant by focusing on their common enemy — the “appalling
anti-Christian world power” — and by building a common social-political
program. All the same, there were
distinctive Roman Catholic and Protestant paths to this
end.
The Catholic effort had to overcome the view that the
Church of Rome, from the fall of Napoleon in 1815 through the revolutions of
1848, was reactionary, favoring the oppression of the people, opposing their
democratic aspirations, and ignoring the new problems posed by industrial
society.[10] It was in the German
states that the revolutionary year 1848 saw creation of “The Catholic Federation
of Germany.” Designed to protect
Catholic rights in any future German union, this “Catholic club” became the
“Fraction of the Center” in 1858, and eventually The Center Party. While open in theory to non-Catholics,
the Center Party focused first and foremost on defending Catholic authority,
rights, and church schools.
However, the
young Bishop of Mainz, Wilhelm Emmanuel, Baron von Ketteler, began to shape a
more interesting and ecumenical social Catholicism. During the Catholic
Congress of 1848, he offered a toast to “the plain people” of Germany and
declared that “as religion has need of freedom, so does freedom have need of
religion”: in that time and place, these were unexpected, radical
statements. During the 1860’s, Bishop Ketteler turned to the “social
question.” He denounced the development of what he called “capitalist
absolutism,” called for the creation of Christian labor associations to protect
workers, and urged political reforms that would increase wages, shorten the
working day, and prohibit the labor of children and mothers in factories.[11]
In 1871, following German victory in the
Franco-Prussian War, the German Empire took form. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck immediately
launched his Kulturkampf. At one level, this “culture war” aimed
at reducing the influence of the Catholic church in a predominantly Protestant
empire. The Jesuit religious order,
for example, was banned. At another
level, however, all Christians faced new restrictions. An 1871 law banned all clergymen from
discussing political issues from the pulpit. Other laws gave the German state more
control over the education of all clergy, created a special secular court for
legal cases involving clerics, and required state notification of all clerical
employment. In 1875, the Empire
required that all marriages be civil — not church — ceremonies. In response, Catholic political action
through the Center Party accelerated.
This “Culture War” lasted until 1878, when Bismarck decided that the
greater internal threat to the German Empire came from the
socialists.
The “social Catholicism” of Bishop Ketteler and the
foray into electoral politics represented by Germany’s Center Party came
together in Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical, The New Age (Rerum
Novarum). This remarkable document testified to
Roman Catholicism’s willingness to meet the promise and problems of
industrialization with an affirmative Christian alternative both to the
laissez-faire of classical liberalism and to socialism. Arguing that “the present age handed
over the workers, each alone and defenseless, to the inhumanity of employers and
the unbridled greed of competitors,” Leo rejected the wage theory of liberalism
that considered that wage just which resulted from a free contract between
employer and worker. Leo repudiated
socialism with even greater fervor, terming it “highly unjust” because it
injured workers, violated the rights of lawful owners, perverted the functions
of the state, and threw governments “into utter confusion.”
Instead, Leo turned to “the natual and primeval right
of marriage” and to the family — “the society of the household” — as the proper
foundation for social and economic theory.
The right of ownership, for example, while bestowed on individuals by
nature, was necessarily “assigned to man in his capacity as head of a
family.” Similarly, Leo declared it
“a most sacred law of nature that the father of a family see that his offspring
are provided with all the necessities of life....” In the natural order, he continued, it
was not right “to demand of a woman or a child what a strong adult man is
capable of doing or would be willing to do.” Women, he affirmed, were “intended by
nature for the work of the home...the education of children and the well-being
of the family.” Consequently, Leo
concluded, the principle underlying all employer-worker contracts must be that
the wage be at least “sufficiently large to enable [the worker] to provide
comfortably for himself, his wife, and his children....”[12] This was the goal of the “family
wage.”
Christian Democracy from the Catholic side is, in
fact, best understood as Rerum Novarum put into action. Indeed, in 1901, Leo issued another
encyclical, Graves de Communi Re,
which openly embraced the “Christian Democracy” label. Contrasting this movement with the
principles of Democratic Socialism, Leo stated:
...Christian Democracy, by the
fact that it is Christian, is built, and necessarily so, on the basic principles
of divine faith, and it must provide better conditions for the masses, with the
ulterior object of promoting the perfection of souls made for things eternal.
Hence, for Christian Democracy, justice is sacred; it must maintain that the
right of acquiring and possessing property cannot be impugned, and it must
safeguard the various distinctions and degrees which are indispensable in every
well-ordered commonwealth.[13]
In 1906, Germany’s Center Party launched a great
debate on its future. Julius
Bachem’s article, “We Must Get Out of the Tower” (“Wir mussen aus dem Turm
heraus”), argued that the Party
should cease being strictly “Catholic” and should increase its Protestant
membership as the only way to break out of perpetual minority status. Action toward this end, however, was
deferred.
Abraham
Kuyper 
The Protestant strain of Christian Democracy is
strongly associated with the Dutch pastor, editor, and politician Abraham
Kuyper. The Netherlands, it is
important to remember here, was — almost uniquely — a nation born out of
religious sentiment. For 80 years
(1566-1648), the Dutch Calvinists had fought the Catholic Hapsburgs for
religious — and ultimately political — freedom. The Kingdom of the Netherlands was, most
assuredly, a nation with the soul of a church (and a Protestant one at
that).
The armies of the French Revolution, however, swept
over the Netherlands, unleashing there the “anti-Christian world power.” The necessary task became the rebuilding
of a Christian nation. In 1879,
Kuyper transformed a confessional Calvinist political movement into the
Anti-Revolutionary Party. He saw
the French Revolution as marking:
...the emergence of a spirit that
stole into the historical life of nations and fundamentally set their hearts
against Christ as the God-anointed King....In place of the worship of the most
high God came, courtesy of Humanism, the worship of Man. Human destiny was
shifted from heaven to earth. The Scriptures were unraveled and the Word
of God shamefully repudiated in order to play hostage to the majesty of Reason.[14]
Kuyper also raised his banner against the intrusion
of the industrial principle into local, organic communities. Although writing in 1869, he could have
had Wal-Mart in mind when he said: “The power of capital, in ever more enormous
accumulations, drains away the life blood from our retail trade. A single gigantic wholesaler swallows up
the patronage that formerly enabled any number of stores to flourish.”[15] What he called “the iron steam engine”
even endangered the family:
No longer should each baby drink
warm milk from the breast of its own mother; we should have some tepid mixture
prepared for all babies collectively. No longer should each child have a
place to play at home by its mother; all should go to a common nursery school.[16]
All the same,
Kuyper emphasized that there was no going backwards. Rather, those who
believed in Christ must embrace democracy, the spirit of which would only grow.
They must “position themselves courageously in the breach of this nation” and
“prepare for a Christian-democratic development of our national government.”[17]
Kuyper also held that this movement must proceed in
cooperation with Holland’s Roman Catholic minority, politically organized as The
Catholic Party. As he told fellow
members of the Anti-Revolutionary Party:
...whereas all the parties of the Revolution ignore,
if not ridicule, the Second Coming of our Lord, our Roman Catholic countrymen
confess with us: ‘Whence he will come again to judge the living and the
dead’....They, like we, acknowledge that all authority and power on earth flows
from God and is rooted in the reality of creation....They say as do you that
this God has sent his only Son into the world and as a reward for his cross has
placed on his head the Mediator’s crown.
And they testify with you that this divinely anointed King now sits at
the right hand of God, [and] controls the destiny of peoples and
States....
All the same,
Kuyper opposed a merger of the two Christian parties, calling such a move “a
betrayal of our history and our principles.”[18]
Crisis and
Renewal 
These cautious steps toward practical cooperation
were as far as Christian Democracy went prior to the mid-20th Century. In the Netherlands, the
Anti-Revolutionary Party dominated national politics from 1897 until the Nazi
conquest of the land in 1940. In
Germany, the Center Party participated in a number of coalition governments and
— following World War I — helped to craft the Weimar Republic. However, the Party was unable to weather
the economic upheavals of the early 1930’s nor to prevent Adolph Hitler and his
National Socialist Party from rising to power. Following a tumultuous three
years, Hitler abolished the Center Party in July 1933. Similarly, a Christian Democratic
movement in Italy, called the Popular Party and organized in 1919 by the priest
Don Luigi Stutzo, was declared illegal in 1925 by the Fascist regime of Benito
Mussolini.
However, in the crucible of World War II, Christian
Democracy found renewal and a new language. Here, I would like to focus on the
example of France.
A key figure was
Emmanuel Mounier. Writing in the Catholic idea-journal, Espirit, Mounier
worked out a “Christianized” version of individualism, called “personalism.”
This approach saw every human person as unique, a “free agent” with “inherent”
moral qualities and with rights rooted in a natural law. This vision
placed strong emphasis on the importance of developing all dimensions of the
human personality: “social as well as individual and spiritual as well as
material.” Mounier emphasized that the full flowering of the individual
would come only through social bodies such as family, local community, and labor
association. He called for creation of a revolutionary Christian party,
one “hard,” one worthy of Christ, one “radical” in its social-economic vision.[19]
In 1943, a young
Catholic philosophy student and disciple of Mounier, Gilbert Dru, drew up a
Manifesto for postwar Christian Democratic work. He emphasized the
transforming quality of true Christian action: the whole person must
become engaged, not just as a cog in a party machine, but as a militant working
to build a new France on radical Christian principles. A year later, Dru
paid for this Manifesto with his life, being shot by the German Gestapo in
Lyons.[20]
The further
elaboration of Christian Democratic doctrine came primarily from two
journalist-philosophers, Etienne Gilson and Etienne Borne, both writing for the
journal, Aube. They rejected the atomistic individualism of the 19th
Century “bourgeoisie” which, they said, had exhibited a “narrow,” self-centered
outlook and had shown “an indifference toward basic institutions such as the
family.” These writers also scorned the Socialists and Communists for
their “materialism” and their hostility toward revealed religion. Indeed,
bourgeois liberalism and communism could be seen as “two facets of a single
error.” The task now facing Western Civilization was to find a middle way
between bourgeois liberalism and collectivism.[21]
A second plank in
the new Christian Democratic platform was that, while the movement and party
would be openly Christian, it would be neither clerical nor strictly Catholic.
Following the anti-religious darkness of the Nazi conquest of Europe, this
movement would instead forcefully seek to unite Catholic and Protestant
believers and sympathetic others — Jews and agnostics — in a defense of
Christendom as a civilization with religiously infused values.[22]
Christian Democracy also sought to deliver both
freedom and justice. As Etienne
Borne explained:
Freedom without justice is
artificial, deceptive and hypocritical; it can be used to justify the mechanism
of the free market and the servitude of the proletariat; such freedom is, in
fact, the antithesis of freedom. Likewise, justice without freedom leads
to tyranny and to the totalitarianism of Soviet communism or Fascist
corporatism.[23]
To accomplish these tasks — this is, to reconcile
individualism with community and to deliver both justice and liberty — the
French Christian Democrats gave priority to the defense of natural social
groups. As Borne put it: “A people is not really a people and
certainly does not live in freedom unless the natural social groups which
compose it accept each other, and unless the state recognizes their differences
and ensures that their interests are represented.”[24] This would be true democratic
pluralism.
Notably, these new Christian Democrats also renounced
the patriarchal, paternalistic family system of old Europe. The father-dominated family could not be
reconciled with “personalism,” they said.
Post-war Christian Democrats
held that women should enjoy equal civil, legal, and political rights. At the same time, restoration of the
family did mean: that control of
education should be returned to parents; that motherhood and childhood should
enjoy special protection by the state; and that heads-of-households should
receive a “family wage,” so that mothers might be empowered to remain home with
their children.[25]
Human Rights also
became a defining Christian Democratic concern, but with a special twist.
Where secular views of the French experience relied on an evolutionary
understanding of rights, the new movement emphasized the rooting of human rights
in the Creation itself, in the Natural Law. Such rights were “inviolable”
and “innate” because their fountainhead was God Himself. Bearing a healthy
suspicion of the state, Christian Democrats embraced Human Rights in order to
protect “the natural rights of each individual” and of “natural social groups”
from the overweening power of government.[26]
Out of this genuine intellectual ferment, Christian
Democracy took political form as the Mouvement Republicain Populaire (or MRP), which became part of the
French governing coalition of 1946.[27]
In the Netherlands, the Anti-Revolutionary Party, in alliance with the
Catholic Party, reclaimed governing power the same year. Christian Democratic parties then won
important elections in formerly fascist Italy (1948) and West Germany
(1949).[28]
Large
Effects 
The effect was large. Christian Democracy created the
spiritual and political conditions that made possible rapid European economic
renewal. It also laid the
foundations for the building of welfare states that were broadly supportive of
families organized on the male breadwinner, female homemaker, childrich
model. This Christian Democratic
moment had two other important results.
First, the dream of European Union was largely born among the postwar
generation of Christian Democratic leaders, notably Robert Schumann of France,
Conrad Adenauer of West Germany, and Alcide de Gaspari of Italy. The early treaties creating the European
Coal and Steel Community (Paris, 1952) and the European Economic Community
(Rome, 1957) focused obstensibly on economic questions. However, their animating spirit came
from a dream to revive Christendom; indeed, to build a democratic version of the
old Holy Roman Empire on the ruins of a continent recently ravaged by war.
The other enduring legacy of postwar Christian
Democracy was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United
Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948. The key architects of this document
were: Charles Malik, an Arab Christian Democrat from Lebanon, who served in 1948
both as secretary of the Commission on Human Rights and as president of the
U.N.’s Economic and Social Council; and Rene Cassin, a French specialist in
international law who, while himself Jewish, was highly sympathetic toward
postwar Christian Democracy.[29]
As one historian has phrased it, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is
“largely identical” with the worldview expressed in Christian Democracy.[30]
Specifically, we find in Article 16(3) the
affirmation of “natural” social institutions:
The family is the natural and
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and
the state.
The word “natural” comes straight out of the
Christian Democratic lexicon. Even
the use of the word “society” here as distinct from and prior to “the state” is
a Christian Democratic marker.
In Article 25, one finds support for family social
rights, with particular emphasis on a “family wage”:
Everyone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his
family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care and necessary social
services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances
beyond his control.
Other provisions declare that men and women have “the
right to marry and found a family” [Article 16(1)] and that “motherhood and
childhood are entitled to special care and assistance” [Article 25(2)]. The Universal Declaration also affirms
parental rights: “Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education
that shall be given to their children” [Article 26(3)].
Even the term “equality,” subject before and later to
so much mischief, finds rich meaning in the Universal Declaration through
“personalist” conceptions of “the right to life” (Article 3), “the dignity and
worth of the human person” (Preamble), and “endowed” human nature:
All human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights. They
are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward one another in a
spirit of brotherhood (Article 1).
Indeed, the only
core Christian Democratic theme not present is an open affirmation of the Deity
of Creation. Several members of the drafting committee, led by Charles
Malik, sought inclusion of this idea. But in the end, they agreed to more
universal language that implied, rather than named, God.[31]
“Silent
Revolution” 
Yet, as early as the
1950’s, Christian Democracy as a vital worldview entered another period of
crisis. The youthful excitement,
energy, and sense of positive Christian revolution evident in the 1940’s
dissipated. In France, Christian
Democracy’s main political vehicle, the MRP, lost support to General Charles de
Gaulle’s new party, the RPI (Ressemblement du Peuple Francois) and by 1958 had
disappeared altogether. In Italy
and West Germany, meanwhile, Christian Democratic parties consolidated their
hold on power at the price of their vision. By the early 1960’s, they were
increasingly pragmatic and bureaucratic, self-satisfied defenders of the status
quo. Ambitious office seekers,
rather than Christian idealists, came to dominate the party. Movements for “moral and political
renewal” became simply mass parties of the right-of-center.[32] When a new “crisis
of values” hit Europe with particular force in the late 1960’s, the Christian
Democrats were unprepared to respond.
They appeared by then as old and discredited guardians of a new kind of
materialism, the very opposite of what the movement’s visionaries
intended.[33]
Indeed, it is now clear that a “silent revolution” in
values set in among Europeans after 1963.
It can be seen in the shift away from values affirmed by Christian
teaching (such as “responsibility, sacrifice, altruism, and sanctity of
long-term commitments”) and toward a strong “secular individualism” focused on
the desires of the self.[34] Family
life became a casualty. Surveys of
European youth in the 1970’s and 1980’s showed that they “appear to be extending
non-conformism with respect to abortion, divorce, etc., to parenthood as well,”
agreeing by large majorities with statements such as “children need only one
parent” and “children are no longer needed for personal fulfillment.”
In explaining this value change, another commentator
has pointed to the swift legalization of abortion and to “the falling awareness”
among Europeans “of the dignity of every person, even the old and
disabled.” He added: “...naked individualism and unbridled
libertinism have become increasingly widespread in recent years...Female
emancipation, which is well advanced,...appears to be headed in this direction,”
as well. Meanwhile, the courts and
public opinion grew tolerant of sexual deviance.[35] Understood in terms of worldview, such
changes symbolized the new triumph of an old foe — “the anti-Christian world
power” originally unleashed in 1789 — over Christian
Democracy.
New Hope From the
East? 
All the same, the 1990’s marked another resurgence of
Christian Democracy, albeit in unexpected places. For instance, a Swedish election in 1991
brought the Christian Democratic Social Party into Sweden’s Parliament for the
first time, where it joined the governing coalition. Over the next three years, the party
successfully pushed for the teaching of Christian values in the state schools
and for a new social benefit to go to stay-at-home
parents.
More dramatically, Christian Democratic parties
emerged in all of the East European nations freed from Communism in
1989-90. In Poland, to choose one
example, the Solidarity Electoral Action bloc came to power in 1997, with a
campaign manifesto declaring:
We can build a modern, just, and
self-sustaining sovereign state; a state founded on patriotic and Christian
values, on love and freedom. These
values have formed our core identity for a thousand years.
In Rumania, the National Peasants’ Christian
Democratic Party won that nation’s November 1996 election. Christian Democratic parties have also
been part of ruling coalitions in Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, Lithuania, and Latvia.[36]
Family issues loom large in these nations and on
Christian Democratic agendas. The
legacy of Communism combined with the arrival of Western-styled social
libertarianism to produce a devastating effect on East European family
structures. Since 1990, divorce
rates have soared; marriage rates have fallen sharply; birth rates have
plummeted. Indeed, in 2005, the
list of the ten nations with the world’s lowest total fertility rates includes
Latvia (1.26), Poland (1.24), Slovenia (1.24), the Czech Republic (1.20), and
Lithuania (1.19). In response,
Christian Democratic parliamentarians from six “new member states of the
European Union” — namely the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lativa, Poland,
Lithuania, and Estonia — met last year and issued their “Family First
Declaration.” They formally
endorsed the March 2004 “Mexico City Declaration” of The World Congress of
Families, and they pledged:
We will coordinate our efforts on
behalf of the traditional family, marriage and the intrinsic value of each human
life so that the future Europe is not associated any longer with the culture of
death, institutionalized egoism and population decline, but with the
preservation of religious, ethical and cultural values that enhance virtuous
life in all relevant aspects.
Healthy family life enhances true and ordered liberty and limits the
power of the state.
This document also endorsed other principles central
to the Christian Democratic worldview:
•
“Procreation is the key to the survival of the human
race.”
•
“Parents possess the primary authority and responsibility to direct the
upbringing and education of their children.”
•
“Good government protects and supports the family and does not usurp the
vital roles it plays in society.”
•
“Sexuality exists for the expression of love between husband and wife and
for the procreation of children in the covenant of
marriage.”
If Eastern Europe — indeed, if Europe as a whole —
has any viable future, it lies along these Christian Democratic
lines.
Lessons 
There has never been a serious Christian Democratic
Party in America. This seems due,
in part, to the mechanics of our single-district electoral structure, which
strongly favor a two-party system with each party in turn serving as an ad hoc
coalition of interest groups.
Christian Democratic parties — with their more coherent worldview —
thrive best in places that use proportional
representation.
Also, Americans have had a more complex or, one might
say, more confused relationship with the legacy of the French Revolution. Back during the 1790’s, Americans were
more likely to sympathize with the Revolution’s repudiation of royal and feudal
power and its appeals to democracy than to worry about the suppression of the
Catholic church. In 1803, President
Thomas Jefferson cut a sweet deal with Napoleon for the purchase of the
Louisiana Territory. And in 1812,
the United States found itself again at war with France’s chief enemy, the
British Empire: and the enemy of my enemy is my friend. Relatively few Americans have shared,
say, Abraham Kuyper’s nightmarish view of “the catastrophe of
1789.”
Still, Europe’s experiment in Christian Democracy
offers several broad lessons for all Christians engaged in modern
politics:
First, the movement has had the most success when it
has held true to the “full” Gospel, particularly to Christ’s radical command
that we love our neighbors as ourselves.
Issues of social welfare and social justice lie near the heart of true
Christian Democracy.
Second, this movement successfully pioneered ways to
funnel public health, education, and welfare programs through churches and
church-related agencies, models that should be of interest to a nation now
experimenting with faith-based initiatives.
Third, Christian Democracy has, at its best, carved
out a “third way” of social-economic policy, independent of both the
liberal-capitalist and socialist mindsets, by being respectful toward family
life and the health of local communities.
And fourth, this movement succeeded only so long as
it found animation in authentic Christian faith and enthusiasm. When those diminished, so did the
coherence and effectiveness of Christian Democracy, and of the modern European
nations as whole.
Endnotes:
1 At http://www.buchanan.org/pa-92-0817-rnc.html (7/11/2005).
2 Abraham Kuyper, “Uniformity: The Curse of Modern Life,” in James D. Bratt, ed., Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial Reader (Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans, 1998): 24.
3 Abraham Kuyper, “Maranatha,” in Bratt, Abraham Kuyper, pp. 210-11. Also: Maria Mitchell, “Materialsim and
Secularism: CDU Politicians and National Socialism, 1945-1949,” The Journal
of Modern History
67 (June 1995): 286.
4 Mitchell, “Materialism and Secularism,” p. 290,
fn.45.
5 Ibid.,
pp. 290-21, fn.46.
6 In: Mario Einaudi and Francois Goguel, Christian Democracy in Italy
and France (Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1952): 81-82.
7 Guido Dierickx, “Christian Democracy and Its Ideological Rivals: An
Empirical Comparison in the Low Countries,” in David Hauley, ed., Christian
Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective (London & New York: Pinter
Publishers, 1994): 24.
8 Diereckx, “Christian Democracy and Its Ideological Rivals,” p.
24.
9 See: Timothy Sherratt, “Christian and Democrat? The Trans-Political
Character of Christian Democracy,” The Catholic Social Science
Review 9 (2004):
57.
10 Noted in the entry,
“Christian Democracy,” found in The Catholic Encyclopedia, at:
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/04708a.htm (6/24/2005), p.
2.
11 “Wilhelm Emmanuel,
Baron von Ketteler,” at: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/
08629c.htm
(7/11/2005): 1-5.
12 Pope Leo XIII, Rerum
Novarum; in Two
Basic Social Encyclicals (Washington, DC: Catholic
University of American Press, 1943): 5-11, 15, 55-59.
13 Leo XIII, Graves De
Communi Re (18
January 1901); at: http://www.ewtn.com/library/
encyc/113grcom.htm
(6/24/2005): 2.
14 Kuyper, “Maranatha,” p.
212.
15 Kuyper, “Uniformity,”
p. 32.
16 Ibid.
17 Kuyper, “Maranatha,” p.
222.
18 Ibid., pp. 218-19.
19 See: Einaudi and Goguel, Christian
Democracy in Italy and France, pp. 81-82; and R.E.M. Irving,
The Christian Democratic Parties of Western Europe (London: George Allen & Unwin,
1979): 30-31.
20 R.E.M. Irving,
Christian Democracy in France (London: George Allen & Unwin,
1973): 53-54,
58.
21 Irving, The
Christian Democratic Parties of Europe, p. 31; and Einaudi and Goguel,
Christian Democracy in Italy and France, pp. 30-31.
22 Noel D. Cary, The
Path to Christian Democracy: German
Catholics and the Party System from Windthorst to Adenauer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996): 180; and Einaudi and Goguel,
Christian Democracy in France and Italy, pp. 28-30,
84.
23 Quoted in Irving,
Christian Democracy in France, p. 55.
24 Ibid., p. 60.
25 Ibid., pp. 61-62.
26 See: Emiel Lamberts, ed., Christian
Democracy in the European Union, 1945/1995 (Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press, 1997): 440.
27 For a special focus on
the German story, see: Cary, The Path to Christian Democracy.
28 The movement also
sprang up in Latin America with Christian Democracy particularly strong in
Chile. In 1964, Eduardo Frei came
to power there with a solid Christian Democratic majority and launched an
ambitious program of economic and social reform focused on family and small
property.
29 On their respective
roles, see: Allan Carlson, “The Family is the Natural...Unit of Society:
Evidence From the Social Sciences.”
Paper presented to the European Regional Dialogue for The Doha
International Conference for the Family, Geneva, Switzerland, August 23-25,
2004.
30 Lamberts, Christian
Democracy in the European Union, p.142.
31 See: Rene Cassin, “Historique de la
Declaration Universelle de 1948,” in La Pensée et Action (Paris: F. Lalou, 1972): 108,
115.
32 Lamberts, Christian
Democracy in the European Union, pp. 143-144.
33 Although occurring
later, the Italian Christian Democratic Party — beset by scandals and infighting
— disbanded in 1994.
34 See: Ronald Inglehart, The Silent
Revolution: Changing Values and
Political Styles Among Western Publics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977): 216; and Ron Lesthaeghe, “A Century of
Demographic and Cultural Change in Western Europe,” Population and
Development Review 9 (Sept. 1983):
29.
35 Lamberts, Christian
Democracy in the European Union, p. 445.
36 See: Adrian Karatnycky,
“Christian Democracy Resurgent: Raising the Banner of Faith in Eastern Europe,” Foreign Affairs
77 (Jan/Feb. 1998): 13-18. |