Lethally Reliable Predictor
Criminologists have long believed that murder rates will climb when the number
of young people grows, especially in areas where unemployment runs high and
urban populations are growing. However, a new study by
Rutgers sociologist Julie A. Phillips suggests that the homicide rate may
track less closely than previously thought with the size of population centers
or with the number or employment status of the young people.
But one all-too-certain portent of murder remains: namely, divorce.
Examining county-by-county data collected between 1970 and 1999, Phillips
uncovers a pattern that contradicts rather than confirms conventional wisdom
among criminologists. In analyses that she calls “intriguing,” Phillips shows
that the statistical relationships between homicide rates on the one hand and
unemployment and population size on the other are both negative, so
manifesting “effects that run contrary to common theoretical expectations.”
As most criminologists would expect, Phillips does discern “a positive
association between the proportion [of] young [in various areas] and homicide
rates within U.S. counties across time.” But Phillips’s
multi-variable analysis establishes that “criminogenic forces, such as poor
social conditions…, can alter the association between the relative size of the
young population and homicide rates.”
One particular social measure especially helps Phillips recognize areas with
the kind of “low social control” that looses murderous
impulses, even if those impulses are “less heavily concentrated in the young
age ranges” in the affected areas than some theorists might have expected.
The indicator of social breakdown that Phillips highlights as a
predictor of murder is the divorce rate.
Unlike elevated unemployment rates and burgeoning population size—both
surprisingly linked to lower homicide rates—high divorce rates do augur
bloodshed. In four out of five of Phillips’s statistical
models, the county divorce rate emerges as a statistically significant
predictor of the homicide rate (p < 0.05 in all four models).
“On average,” Phillips accordingly observes, “higher levels of the
percentage of the population divorced are associated with larger homicide
rates within counties over time.”
County coroners, it appears, will often be called on for grim duties wherever
the divorce courts are busy.
(Source: Julie A. Phillips, “The Relationship Between Age Structure and
Homicide Rates in the United States, 1970 to 1999,” Journal of Research in
Crime and Delinquency 43 [2006]: 230-260.)
Lessons from Europe 
The more religious nature of the United States is often attributed to having a
religious free-market where no denomination is nationally established, leaving
churches to compete for members. So does this mean that if European countries
follow the U.S. and disestablish their state churches that Europe might become
more religious? Not according to two Dutch scholars, whose study quantifies
other factors—including increased participation of women in the labor force
and increased religious pluralism—as more responsible for religious decline
across the Atlantic.
A
sociologist and a theologian at Tilberg University in the Netherlands examined
data from the European Values Study, a series of surveys conducted in almost
all European countries between 1999 and 2000, to explore how characteristics
of individuals and countries influence individual religious beliefs and
practices. They found, among factors at the individual level, that women in
paid employment were significantly less religious (both in terms of belief and
practice) than their peers who stayed at home. In fact, the level of religious
belief among employed women was more like those of men, who were found to be
less religious than women overall. These consistent patterns were found in
almost all countries and were statistically significant (p<.001) in
multivariate tests.
Looking at the characteristics of countries, the study found that religious
pluralism as measured by the Herfindahl Index—meaning the more religions in a
country and the more evenly distributed their market shares—as well as the
degree to which people trust the churches in their country were each
significantly related to religious belief and to religious practice: The
greater the religious diversity of a country, the lower the levels of
individual belief and practice; whereas higher levels of public confidence in
the church increased each of the two measures.
While differences in the extent of religious belief and practice were found
among Protestants, Catholics, and Orthodox, all of these Christians were found
to be consistently less religious in both measures than were adherents of
“other” religions.
The researchers concede that identifying a pattern to their findings may not
be easy. But their analysis regarding the effects of female employment and
religious diversity in Europe offers lessons that Americans would be wise to
ponder.
(Source: Loek Halman and Veerle Draulans, “How Secular is Europe?” The British
Journal of Sociology 57 [June 2006]: 263-289.)
Solving the Fertility Paradox 
Fertility rates have risen in recent decades for unmarried American women.
Fertility rates have likewise risen in recent decades for married
American women. So why has the overall American fertility
rate changed very little? This question recently attracted
the attention of a team of demographers at the University of Oregon, and their
analysis identifies the national retreat from wedlock as the key to the
mystery.
The researchers begin their work by defining “the apparent paradox” in
American fertility data. They note that between 1974 and
2000 the birth rate among unmarried white women ages 20 to 39 “more than
tripled, rising from 13 per 1,000 in 1974 to 46 per 1,000 in 2000” and that
during the same period the birth rate among married white women of the same
ages “rose by nearly half, from 94 [per 1,000] to 135 [per 1,000].”
The analysts report that “patterns are similar for black women,”
unmarried and married. Nonetheless, the data indicate that
1974 to 2000 was “a period of relatively flat total birth rates.”
What is going on here? When the Oregon scholars parse the
data, they highlight “the effects that marriage behavior has on the
composition of married and unmarried women.” That is, in
the researchers’ statistical model “a decline in marriage
will cause increases in the nonmarital birth rate, the marital birth rate, and
the nonmarital birth rate relative to the marital birth rate, even though the
total birth rate does not change.” The Oregon scholars
characterize recent American fertility data as “remarkably consistent with the
various predictions of the [statistical] model.”
Apparently, when fewer women marry, those who still do wed tend to be
distinctively committed to family and childbearing.
Meanwhile, as a growing number of women wed late in life or not at all, an
increasing number of them—predictably enough—bear children out of wedlock.
Of course, even if a society’s overall fertility rate remains unchanged,
serious social problems are brewing when wedding bells rarely ring and when
more and more children have unmarried parents.
(Source: Jo Anna Gray, Jean Stockard, and Joe Stone, “The Rising Share of
Nonmarital Births: Fertility Choice or Marriage Behavior,” Demography 43
[2006]: 241-253.)
Not-So-Gay Gays 
Though very popular among progressive social
commentators, the notion that homosexuality is perfectly normal and healthy
does not look very credible to researchers who have examined it closely.
The latest evidence linking homosexuality to negative life
characteristics appears in a study recently published in the Journal of
Youth and Adolescence by a team of researchers from Brock
University in Canada.
Examining data collected from over 3,700 Ontario high school students, the
Brock researchers find that adolescents who report “exclusive heterosexual
attraction” experience “the most positive status across domains” under
investigation: psychological functioning, academic orientation, parental
relationships, friendship quality, victimization, school culture, neighborhood
quality, and attitudes toward risk.
Though bisexual adolescents report “the most negative results” documented in
this study, homosexual adolescents likewise look much worse off than their
heterosexual peers. Compared to exclusively heterosexual
peers, students reporting same-sex attraction manifest “significantly worse
results” in four areas: psychological functioning, parental relationships,
victimization, and neighborhood quality.
Not all academics will welcome the finding that homosexuality comes with
“heightened risk and difficulties” for affected youth. But
the authors of the new study harmonize their research with the prevailing
canons of political correctness by calling for “programs aimed at assisting
these [homosexual] youth.” But readers of their study may
conclude that what is most needed is the elimination of educational programs
that legitimate and even glamorize homosexuality as they invite youth to
jeopardize their psychological health by experimenting with unnatural forms of
sexuality.
(Source: Michael A. Busseri et al., “Same-Sex Attraction and Successful
Adolescent Development,” Journal of Youth and Adolescence 35 [2006]: 563-575.)
Shadow of a Departure, Challenge of a New Arrival 
The arrival of a first child always brings
challenges for a couple. But new research suggests that
couples in which both father and mother are in their first marriage cope with
this transition more successfully than do couples in which one or both of the
partners have been in a previous marriage or cohabiting union.
To understand the distinctively intense difficulties that a new baby
brings to parents in a second or third union, readers may turn to a study
recently published in the Journal of Divorce & Remarriage by
psychologist Geneviève Bouchard of the University of Moncton.
By scrutinizing data collected from 140 French-Canadian couples all
experiencing the arrival of a first child, Bouchard establishes a clear link
between parents’ previous relationship history and their ability to adjust to
the new arrival. Data for the mothers in the study
indicate that “those who have experienced a divorce or relationship
dissolution are globally less conjugally adjusted at both points of assessment
than those in first unions.”
Further analysis reveals, however, that “men’s divorce or separation history
matters the most.” Bouchard calculates that “the decline
in relationship functioning associated with the transition to motherhood … is
about three times larger for women who are married or cohabiting with a man
with [the] ‘baggage’ [of a failed previous marriage or cohabiting
relationship].” Further analysis reveals that compared to
peers in a first union, fathers who had failed in a previous relationship were
more likely to be simply cohabiting with their current partner rather than
being married (p < 0.001).”
Bouchard characterizes “relational cost associated with second unions” as
“modest” and even as relatively “small,” yet she concedes that the effect in
view is “deleterious” and “significant.” What is more,
careful statistical analysis proves that the negative relationship effect
linked to a failed previous marriage or cohabitational union cannot be
accounted for by the presence or absence of children from the previous union,
nor can it be explained away by attending to demographic variables, such as
age or length of relationship.
The national epidemic of divorces in recent decades can only mean that for
millions of couples, the arrival of a new one has brought extra difficulty and
strain.
(Source: Geneviève Bouchard, “Transition to Motherhood and Relationship
Quality: Does Divorce or Separation History Matter?” Journal of Divorce &
Remarriage 44.1/2 [2005]: 107-116.)
Violent Homes, Violent Neighborhoods 
Progressives never tire of decrying the evil of
domestic violence, particularly that directed against women.
Curiously, however, they rarely say anything about the cultural erosion
of the social institution that best shields women from such violence: namely,
marriage. Still, the evidence continues to accumulate
showing that marriage matters a good deal in reducing women’s vulnerability to
domestic violence. Indeed, a study recently published in
Public Health Reports indicates that a woman seeking safety will
want to live in an intact marriage herself—and in a neighborhood filled with
intact marriages.
Conducted by researchers at the University of Tennessee and the University of
Cincinnati, the new study examines the effects of “contextual risk” on the
prevalence and severity of Intimate Partner Violence (IPV).
The Tennessee and Cincinnati scholars calculated the “contextual risk”
for IPV for a nationally representative sample of 2,273 couples with children
ages 5 to 17, using data collected from these couples in 1990 and 1994 by
interviewers and Census officials. Those calculations
highlight the importance of marital status as a predictor of Intimate Partner
Violence.
“As might be expected in a sample of households with school-aged children,”
the researchers report, “stably married couples . . . have the lowest rates of
I[ntimate]P[artner]V[iolence].” For stably married couples, the researchers
calculate an incidence of 16.2% for overall IPV and of 3.5% for IPV involving
“physical violence with injury.” In contrast, the
researchers find that “cohabiting couples show the highest rates of
IPV.” Among cohabiting couples the rate of overall
IPV runs more than twice as high as that found among stably married couples
(37.5% among “stable cohabiting couples”; 33.6% among “new” cohabiting
couples). The rate of physical violence with injury runs
four times as high as that found among stably married couples (16.1% among
stable cohabiting couples; 14.1% among new cohabiting couples).
Though the incidence of overall and severe IPV does run higher among newly
married or remarried couples than among stably married couples, it still runs
far below that observed among cohabiting couples. (The researchers report a
rate of overall IPV of 18.7% among newly married or remarried couples and a
rate of IPV with physical violence with injury of 7.0%.)
Nor is it just a woman’s own marital status that determines her vulnerability
to domestic violence. The authors of the new study
establish that “neighborhood context” also helps determine that vulnerability.
And in determining whether a neighborhood is “advantaged” or
“disadvantaged” the researchers look at—among other social and economic
characteristics—the fraction of households in the neighborhood that are headed
by single parents. When that fraction rises, the
neighborhood becomes more disadvantaged.
The researchers note that, compared to violence-free couples, “couples with
IPV are more likely . . . to live in neighborhoods of high disadvantage.”
Among couples who reported Intimate Partner Violence, 27.3% lived in
disadvantaged neighborhoods; among couples who reported no IPV, only 18.3%.
Among couples who reported severe domestic violence involving injury,
more than a third (35.2%) lived in disadvantaged neighborhoods, compared to
less than a fifth (19.1%) of those who reported no severe domestic violence.
Statistical tests identify all of these neighborhood-context effects as
significant (p < 0.001 for all neighborhood effects).
Those truly intent on reducing the incidence of domestic abuse are those at
work to reverse the national retreat from marriage.
(Source: Greer Litton Fox and Michael L. Benson, “Household and Neighborhood
Contexts of Intimate Partner Violence,” Public Health Reports 121 [2006]:
419-427.)
Hitting the Bottle—Hard! 
With good reason, health and educational officials are worried about the
effects of heavy binge drinking among the nation’s high schoolers.
According to the authors of a new study on the problem, “Heavy episodic
drinking among young people is increasingly perceived as an important social
problem.” The magnitude of the problem is suggested by a
2000 study by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in which
researchers documented “a heavy episodic drinking prevalence…of 26.2% among
10th graders in a two-week time frame.” Accordingly, the
authors of the new study—all public-health scholars from the University of
Rhode Island, Rhode Island Hospital, or Brown University School of
Medicine—set out to identify the social and personal characteristics that
foster or prevent this problem.
Parsing data collected from 938 Arkansas students enrolled in the 9th, 10th,
and 11th grades, the researchers discern some clear patterns.
Students who report heavy episodic drinking are disproportionately
“older, male, from families that receive welfare benefits, are not living in
intact families, are attending religious services less often, and are more
likely to have delinquent friends than those who have not drunk heavily in the
month prior to the survey.”
In simple bivariate statistical tests, students living in an intact family are
almost half as likely to binge drink as peers not living in an intact family
(-46%; p < 0.01). The protective effect of living in an
intact family declines in a more sophisticated multivariate statistical test
that takes into account age, sex, welfare receipt, and other background
variables, but it is still sizable and significant (-32%; p < 0.05).
Though the effect is smaller than that of family structure, strong attachment
to parents also predicts less vulnerability to heavy episodic drinking.
Compared to peers without such attachment, students who reported a
strong attachment to their parents were between one-fourth to one-fifth less
likely to binge drink (-26% in simple bivariate analysis, p < 0.01; -22% in
sophisticated multivariate analysis, p < 0.05).
No doubt, health educators will do their best to combat the problem of binge
drinking among adolescents. However, until Americans end
the national retreat from marriage and the national epidemic of divorce, tens
of thousands of distressed and rootless young people will continue to take
dubious comfort from a bottle.
(Source: Barbara J. Costello, Bradley J. Anderson, and Michael D. Stein,
“Heavy Episodic Drinking Among Adolescents: A Test of Hypotheses Derived from
Control Theory,” Journal of Alcohol and Drug Education 50.1 [2006]: 35-56.)