‘American Exceptionalism’?  

In recent decades, demographers have reported a sharp and apparently permanent decline in the overall fertility of most industrialized countries.  Labeled “the second demographic transition,” this emergence of “structural, long-term subreplacement cohort fertility” has appeared linked to growing acceptance of non-marital cohabitation and to a rise in the fraction of births occurring outside of wedlock.  As University of Michigan scholars Ron J. Lesthaeghe and Lisa Neidert explain in a recent analysis, this second demographic transition also has been linked to a pronounced moral reorientation.  This moral orientation reflects “the expression of secular and anti-authoritarian sentiments of better-educated men and women who [hold] an egalitarian world view” and whose lives reflect “self-actualization, individualistic and expressive orientations, [and] need for recognition.”  This moral reorientation typically means “postponing or eschewing parenthood altogether because of more pressing competing goals such as prolonging education, achieving more stable income positions, increased consumerism,... [and] keeping an open future.”

But as they survey recent global fertility data, Lesthaeghe and Neidert ask, “Is the United States an exception to all this?”  After all, the U.S. total fertility rate has risen from 1.81 in 1980 to just above replacement level [2.1] in 2001.  As a consequence, “the American total fertility rate now towers above those of many of its industrialized competitors, and especially those of the E[uropean]U[nion]-25 and Japan.  This means that America may “easily avoid the negative population growth momentum that many other industrialized countries are about to face as a result of 25 years of ‘lowest-low’ fertility—that is T[total]F[ertility]R[ates] below 1.5 children. 

To try to explain the population dynamics at work in the United States, the Michigan researchers turn to the work of social historian Allan Carlson, who has argued that “Americans are breaking free from Malthusian darkness,” making their social pattern “something different” from what demographers see in other industrialized nations.  “The best explanation for America’s greater fecundity,” Carlson has asserted, “is the higher degree of religious identification and behavior shown by Americans, when compared to Europeans.”  In a similar vein, Lesthaeghe and Neidert cite the work of author Phillip Longman, who stresses that the key to understanding “American demographic ‘exceptionalism’” is “differential fertility between the religious and the secular.”  In the United States, Longman has written, “tomorrow’s children...will be for the most part descendants of a comparatively narrow and culturally conservative segment of society.”

Are Carlson and Longman right? “Is the US population immune to the [second demographic] transition features,” Lesthaeghe and Neidert ask, “as a result of higher spiritual values and social conservatism?”

After exhaustive analysis of fertility and social-values data, the Michigan scholars conclude that the accuracy of the Carlson-Longman explanation of American demographic patterns depends on just what region of the country is in view. 

 When looking at “the northern Atlantic, the Pacific, the Great Lakes, and the less religious West (Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado),” the authors of this new analysis see no evidence of “American demographic exceptionalism.”  At least among the non-Hispanic whites living in these areas of the country,  researchers find that “such features of the second demographic transition as lower and later fertility and tolerance for cohabitation have been emerging in much the same way as in western Europe.”

However, when the analysts shift their attention to “the Midwest, the Great Plains, and the South,” they do indeed encounter something like the “American demographic exceptionalism” of which Carlson and Longman speak.  Marital fertility among non-Hispanic whites is running relatively high within this “non-negligible section” of the country, made up of people who are—in the analysts’ view—”on average more rural than metropolitan, less well-educated, [and] adhere more to Evangelical Christianity or Mormonism.”  The second demographic transition so visible in Western Europe and in states such as New Jersey, Washington, and Michigan simply is not taking place in Iowa, Nebraska, or Alabama—though Lesthaeghe and Neidert do note relatively “high levels of unmarried fertility among young mothers” in the South.

As they try to interpret the mixed pattern of support for the Carlson-Longman thesis, the Michigan researchers argue that “the picture would be better described by the term ‘American bipolarity’ than ‘American exceptionalism.’”  What is more, the analysts regard this bipolarity as fundamental not only to America’s demographics but also to its politics.  After all, while liberal and leftist activists try to universalize the second demographic transition, “the conservative and religious right is openly and vocally trying to fight back (e.g., with amendments seeking to ban same-sex marriage, and closure of abortion clinics).  This has not happened in Europe.”  In other words, the forces defending family life are still much stronger in the United States than they are in Europe.

(Source: Ron J. Lesthaeghe and Lisa Neidert, “The Second Demographic Transition in the United States: Exception or Textbook Example?” Population and Development Review 32(2006): 669-698.) 

Watching the Fights, Paying the Cost  

Thousands of American adults regularly travel to Las Vegas to watch professional boxing matches.  All too many American children, however, do not need to leave their own homes to witness a fight.  With good reason, though, psychologists worry about the psychological future of such children.  In a study recently completed at the University of North Carolina, a team of pediatric researchers sought to identify the circumstances that put children at greatest risk of witnessing violent disagreements in the home.  The findings of this study should intensify concerns about the consequences of family fragmentation.  For although a child living with a mother and father may well see parents disagree—perhaps even violently—the likelihood that a child will experience violent disagreements in the home rises sharply when the father disappears. 

Concerned about the effects of domestic violence on children, the authors of the new study set out to determine the prevalence of “violent disagreements”—that is, “disagreements [that] involved hitting or throwing”—in American homes.  Parsing data collected through a national phone survey conducted in 2003, the North Carolina researchers identified a number of domestic circumstances that apparently foster such violent discord.  One of those circumstances is the absence of a father in the home.  Noting the importance of family structure in determining “disagreement style,” the researchers observe, “Single-mother homes had a markedly higher likelihood of violent disagreement (odds ratio [OR]: 1.95) than 2-parent (biological) homes.”  The elevated risk of violent disagreements persists as a feature of single-mother homes even in statistical models that take into account other social characteristics of the child, the parent, and the community.

The results of this new study are deeply disconcerting at a time when millions of American children live with single mothers. After all, as the North Carolina scholars soberly acknowledge, “Witnessing domestic violence increases a child’s risk for emotional and behavioral problems and may be associated with adverse physical outcomes.”

(Source: Charity G. Moore et al., “The Prevalence of Violent Disagreements in US Families: Effects of Residence, Race/Ethnicity, and Parental Stress,” Pediatrics 119 Supplement [2007]: S68-S76.)

The Myth of Gay Discrimination  

Is discrimination against individuals who identify themselves as gay or lesbian rampant in America? While champions of “gay rights” claim it is, the findings of a demographic study in the Journal of Economic Perspectives suggest that men and women who engage in same-sex intimacy—and particularly those who live together as pairs—appear to be doing fairly well and often better than Americans who do not.

Parsing data from the Public Use Micro Sample of 2000 U.S. Census, the study found not only that same-sex couples are better educated than their opposite-sex counterparts but also enjoy higher household incomes. Whereas 43 percent of partners of same-sex coupled households have earned a college degree, only 28 percent of married men and 26 percent of married women reported the same. Also in the micro sample (where same-sex households represented 10 percent of their opposite-sex counterparts), the mean household income of “gay male partners” was $91,676; “lesbian partners,” $73,760; and male-female couples, $73,235. Even the mean investment income of each type of same-sex household was higher than traditional households.

Furthermore, the study found that same-sex couples, rather than being relegated to the other side of the tracks, are more likely to live in affluent, fashionable, and upscale places like San Francisco, Washington, D.C., and Austin, Texas. Whereas 90 percent of “gay male partners” and 85 percent of “lesbian partners” were living in major metropolitan centers, only 75 percent of married couples did so.

The only variable in which same-sex couples do not compare favorably is household size. As might be expected, same-sex couples are raising dramatically fewer children relative to their opposite-sex counterparts. While 62 percent of opposite-sex couples have children in the home, less than 10 percent of “gay male partners” and 22 percent of “lesbian partners” do so, often the result of marriages that have failed. The researchers lament that “costs of children are higher” for such couples, including what they call “discriminatory obstacles” they face in adoption. Unfortunately, they fail to acknowledge the natural advantage opposite-sex couples enjoy when it comes to children; in most cases a married man and woman can (and do) have children naturally without depending upon others to procreate for them or the state to arrange adoptions for them.

If these findings do not paint a picture of an oppressed minority, then the anxiety that homosexuals often experience may be due less to any animus they claim is directed at them and more to what they impose upon themselves by discriminating against natural ways of living that would give them something far more important than a nice paycheck and a fancy neighborhood.

(Source: Dan A. Black, Seth G. Saunders, and Lowell J. Taylor, “The Economics of Lesbian and Gay Families,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21 [Spring 2007]: 53-70.)

As the Family Goes, So Goes the Church  

Has the decline of religious observance in the West triggered a retreat from marriage and family life or has the latter brought about the former? Two recent journal articles, one exploring the impact of fertility rates on religious practice and the other measuring the impact of parental divorce on the religiosity of young adult children, suggest that patterns of family formation (or lack thereof) influence religiosity more than many sociologists acknowledge.

Writing in Policy Review, Mary Eberstadt of the Hoover Institution observes how the “unprecedented and overall ‘sustained fall’ in birthrates that characterize Western Europe today” not only started much earlier than assumed but also predates the decline in religious practice seen today. She observes that declines in birthrates occurred during periods when Christianity was still largely practiced, whether in France in the late-18th century, in Britain in the late-19th century, or in Ireland in the mid-20th century. In all cases, decline in religious practice followed fertility decline, although she acknowledges that religious decline arrived at a much faster clip in Ireland (within a generation) than in the other two countries.

Noting the same pattern of lower birthrates in the more secular Northeastern United States relative to higher birth rates of the more religious South, Eberstadt concludes: “Something about the family inclines people toward religiosity.” Whether it’s the experience of childbirth, being married for a long period of time, or the binding together of the generations, these “death-defying” family experiences “make it easier for those living in families to make related transcendent leaps of the religious variety.”

A study by sociologists at the University of Texas, linking parental divorce to lower levels of religiosity among 1,500 Americans ages 18 to 35, confirms Eberstadt’s theory. Looking at data from the National Survey on the Moral and Spiritual Lives of Young Adults conducted by the Institute for American Values, the researchers found that offspring of divorce report substantially lower levels of church attendance (p < .001) and a modest decline in prayer (p <.10) relative to children whose married parents stick together. These patterns were consistent across all statistical models, including those that controlled for childhood religiosity and adult marital status (each of which were also statistically linked to adult religiosity).

The researchers also found a “clear explanation” for these findings: that divorced fathers are much less engaged in the religious nurture of their children than fathers of intact families (p <.001). While divorced mothers were also less involved in the religious nurture of their children, “it is the distinctive role of fathers that appears to account for the gap in self-reported [church] attendance among young adults.” The researchers speculate that just as parental divorce tends to diminish a family’s participation in church life, religious disengagement may be more pronounced among men, who are generally less involved than women in church life even when married. They also theorize that parental divorce tends to disrupt contact between children and extended family members that would otherwise reinforce the religious nurturing of children.

(Sources: Mary Eberstadt, “How the West Really Lost God,” Policy Review, June-July 2007, and Jiexia Elisha Zhai et al., “Parental Divorce and Religious Involvement among Young Adults,” Sociology of Religion 68 [2007]: 125-144.)

The Psychological Plus of Married Parenthood  

Divorce continues to be sold as a ticket to happiness for married parents who think they can no longer share a life (and children) together. At the same time, studies continue to quantify, as does one conducted by two professors at Ohio State, the extent to which divorced or single parents end up more miserable than their married peers.

Looking at data from the second wave (1992) of the National Survey of Families and Households, sociologists Anna-Marie Cunningham and Chris Knoester explore the links between marriage, psychological well-being, and gender among parents. And they find that single parents, relative to their married counterparts, are significantly more likely to report traditional depressive symptoms (feeling sad or anxious) and higher rates of alcohol abuse. While the links between single parenthood and depressive symptoms were significant (p <.001) in two of the three statistical models, the correlations with alcohol abuse reached significance in all three models (p <.05 or p <.001). Just as revealing, the association between parents who experienced a marital breakup in the previous five years (a control variable) and depressive symptoms was robust in all three models (p <.001).

Other findings help to explain why unmarried parents report lower levels of mental health. Given that the control variables of religious involvements and spending time with children were each found to moderate depressive symptoms and alcohol abuse among parents (whether married or not), previously established differences between married and unmarried parents in these behaviors, a pattern the researchers neglect to mention, shed light on their central finding.

Also of interest: mothers and fathers were found to handle depression differently, as the former (whether married or not) are more likely to report traditional depressive symptoms relative to the latter, who are more likely to abuse alcohol. While interactive tests demonstrated how various parenting burdens and responsibilities moderate or explain mothers’ propensity toward the traditional symptoms (but not fathers’ attraction to alcohol), they confirmed that the multiple pressures of parenthood affect mothers and fathers differently, as fathers, for example, seem more agitated where gender roles become more equalized. As the researchers frame it: “Mothers and fathers do not experience parenthood the same way—there are gendered expectations and pressures that differentially affect mothers’ and fathers’ depressive symptoms.

Although the study’s design did not allow for comparing depression symptoms and alcohol abuse among the same couples before and after divorce, its confirmation of the clear psychological advantages of marriage should prompt couples considering divorce to ask themselves the 1992 Rodney King plea, “Can’t we all just get along?”

(Source: Anna-Marie Cunningham and Chris Knoester, “Marital Status, Gender, and Parents’ Psychological Well-Being,” Sociological Inquiry 77 [May 2007]: 264-287.)

Putting Baby to Breast  

Researchers from the University of California, Davis and San Francisco, were merely stating a universally-recognized truth when they recently declared, “Breastfeeding is the healthiest way to feed an infant.”  However, these California scholars went beyond the obvious in their investigation of the reasons that “many childbearing women never breastfeed.” 

Analyzing California Health Services data for 1999-2001, the researchers establish that—in general—”women with lower education levels and lower incomes were more likely never to breastfeed.”  However, complete parsing of the data reveals that breastfeeding depends in part on social dynamics not directly determined by diplomas or dollars.  First, the researchers discovered that “those who were unmarried were more likely never to breastfeed” than those who are married.  While only 9.2% of married women in the study never breastfed their babies, that percentage was 16% among mothers “living with a partner” outside of wedlock (Odds Ratio of 1.88) and was 20.5% among single mothers (Odds Ratio 2.54).  Apparently, increasing the number of women who breastfeed is not merely a matter of getting more of them to college; somehow, public health officials need to reverse the cultural erosion of marriage in America.

The baleful effects of that cultural erosion may, in fact, help account for another striking finding reported by the California researchers.  “Latina women born outside of the 50 U.S. States and Washington, D.C.,” the researchers report, “were more likely than women in any other single racial/ethnic group to breastfeed their infants, despite lower education and lower family incomes.”  What is even more stunning, however, is the finding that “U.S.-born Latinas...[were] more than twice as likely to never breastfeed as foreign-born Latinas.” 

It would appear that Latina women come to this country fortified by a healthy familismo that fosters breastfeeding even without the supports of college education or high household income.  Lamentably, however, many daughters of these family-minded women are swept away from their mothers’ moorings by the cultural tides that endanger family, marriage, and unsuckled babies throughout 21st-century America.

(Source: Katherine E. Heck, et al., “Socioeconomic Status and Breastfeeding Initiation Among California Mothers,” Public Health Reports 121 [2006]: 51-59, emphasis added.)